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I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has spent any time in criminal trial courts is famil-
iar with the following scenario. An undercover officer swears that on
a certain date he was on narcotics surveillance duty on the corner of
two streets in a "well-known high-crime area." At that time (gener-
ally late at night), he observed John Jones (now the defendant), stand-
ing under a dimly illuminated street light on the other side of the
block. Recognizing Jones as a "long-time drug user and seller," the
officer crossed the street to confront Jones. When Jones saw the
plainclothed officer, he responded by "making furtive gestures" and
dropping a handful of small glassine packets (packets that the officer
quickly recognized as potentially containing heroin). Before the
officer could either properly identify himself as a policeman, or place
the defendant under arrest and administer the Miranda warnings, the
defendant spontaneously blurted out an uncoerced confession:
"That's heroin, and it's mine."
Predictably, the police officer's testimony proves unimpeachable
on cross-examination. Basically, all the defense counsel can ask is,
"Officer, you're lying aren't you?". The witness then replies, "No I'm
not, counselor." The defendant's motion to suppress is shortly
denied. Soon thereafter, the defendant pleads guilty to a drug offense.
This is the famous "dropsy" scenario that transpires regularly in
urban courthouses throughout the country. Did these events really
transpire this way? Of course not.
This entire scenario is pretextual.' The defendant never dropped
the packets voluntarily, and never "spontaneously" blurted out, "It's
1. For examples of confirmatory descriptions, see Albert W. Alschuler, "Close Enough
for Government Work": The Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 347-49;
Tom Barker, An Empirical Study of Police Deviance Other Than Corruption, 6 J. POL. SCl. &
ADMIN. 264 (1978); Tom Barker & David Carter, "Fluffing Up the Evidence and Covering
Your Ass'": Some Conceptual Notes on Police Lying, 11 DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 61 (1990); Fred
Cohen, Police Perjury: An Interview With Martin Garbus, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 363, 365 (1972);
Joseph D. Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinella-Harris Search Warrants and the
Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 408-09; John A. Jenkins, The Lobster Shift:
One Night in the Nation's Busiest Court, 72 ABA J. 56 (1986); Norman G. Kittel, Police
Perjury: Criminal Defense Attorneys' Perspectives, 11 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 11 (1986); Michael
Letwin, Report From the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug Enforcement in New
York City and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 822-23 (1990); Roger Park,
A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 95-96 n.185 (1987);
Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial
Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 98 n.181 (1989); Charles M. Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule
and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 839-40 (1974). See generally Christopher
Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11-12 nn. 27-28
(1991). On the empirical impact of such behavior, see, e.g., William C. Heffernan & Richard
W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police
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my heroin." Everybody knows that-the police officer, the prosecu-
tor, the defense counsel, the defendant, the judge, and ultimately the
appellate court that will eventually uphold the suppression denial and
subsequent conviction (in the rare case of an appeal).2 Yet, the legal
system condones, and perhaps encourages, this entire web of deceit
and pretextuality.
What does this have to do with competency and mental disability
law? Plenty. My thesis is simple: the entire relationship between the
legal process and mentally disabled litigants is often pretextual.3 This
pretextuality is poisonous. It infects all players, breeds cynicism and
disrespect for the law, demeans participants, reinforces shoddy law-
yering, invites blas6 judging, and, at times, promotes perjurious and
corrupt testifying. The reality is well known to frequent consumers of
judicial services in this area: to mental health advocates and other
Compliance With the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 311 (1991); Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal
Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585.
Courts have suppressed such evidence in a handful of cases. See, e.g., State v. Brunori,
578 A.2d 139, 142 n.6 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Acosta, N.Y. L.J., June 25, 1991, at 23
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); People v. Roberts, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 31, 1990, at 30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990);
cf People v. Berrios, 270 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1971) (Fuld, J., dissenting); see also People v.
McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196-98 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970) (denying suppression motion but
warning about the need for "especial caution" in dropsy cases).
2. For a recent important empirical study confirming this view, see Myron W. Orfield,
Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal
Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 100-07 (1992) (86% of judges, public defenders and
prosecutors questioned, including 77% of judges, believe that police officers fabricate evidence
in case reports at least "some of the time"; 92% (including 91% of judges) believe that police
officers lie in court to avoid suppression of evidence at least "some of the time").
3. By "pretextual," I mean simply that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly)
testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently meretricious)
decisionmaking. See Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of
"Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin, Morality]. This is apparent
specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely
distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends." Sevilla, supra note 1, at 840; cf
Edwin J. Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and
Fabrications in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 Ky. L.J. 1 n.1
(1990-91) (defining "pretexts" to include situations where "the government offers a
justification for activity that, if the motivation of the [police] officer is not considered, would be
a legally sufficient justification for the activity" as well as for those activities for which the
proferred justification is "legally insufficient").
For the sharpest juxtaposition of views on pretextual searches, compare James B.
Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
639 (1985) with John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You
Don't, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 523 (1984) and John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 70 (1982) and John M. Burkoff, Pretext Searches, 9 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 25
(1982) and John M. Burkoff, Rejoinder: Truth, Justice, and the American Way-Or Professor
Haddad's "Hard Choices," 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 695 (1985). See also, e.g., Daniel S. Jonas,
Note, Pretext Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Unconstitutional Abuses of Power, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1791 (1989).
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public defender/legal aid/legal service lawyers assigned to represent
patients and mentally disabled criminal defendants, to prosecutors
and state attorneys assigned to represent hospitals, to judges who reg-
ularly hear such cases, to expert and lay witnesses, and, most impor-
tantly, to the mentally disabled person involved in the litigation in
question.
This Article concentrates primarily on two types of cases: invol-
untary civil commitment matters and incompetency to stand trial
determinations. In the latter, the relevance of "competency" is self-
evident; it defines the proceeding in question.' In the former, it may
appear to be somewhat more attenuated. This Article demonstrates
that contested commitment cases regularly turn on a very specific
question of competency (and one rarely mentioned in inpatient com-
mitment statutes):' is the patient sufficiently competent to "do the
right thing," namely, take prescribed antipsychotic medication in a
community setting?6 If he is seen as a good self-medication risk, he is
then competent to exercise medical decisionmaking autonomy (and,
not coincidentally, is less likely to be found in need of involuntary
civil commitment). If he is not, this reflects a level of incompetency
that frequently is translated immediately to a finding of a need for
institutionalization. 7 Competency is reduced to a sterile cause-and-
effect cell where a prediction that a patient is not likely to take medi-
cation in the community (evidence of his incompetency to make "cor-
rect" decisions) becomes the dispositive evidence at the involuntary
civil commitment hearing, a proceeding that would appear to neces-
sarily focus on a host of other questions.
The testimony of forensic experts and decisions of legislators and
fact-finders reflect the pretexts of the forensic mental health system.'
4. A person cannot be tried for a criminal offense if he does not have "sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of understanding . . . [and] a
rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). A conviction of a defendant who is mentally incompetent to
stand trial under this test violates due process. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).
5. Such statutes generally require that the person subject to commitment be mentally ill,
and, as a result of such mental illness, dangerous to himself or to others. See generally 1
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, §§ 2.06, 2.17-.19
(1989) [hereinafter PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL].
6. See generally 2 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 3.45, at 69-73 (Supp.
1992); Michael L. Perlin, Reading the Supreme Court's Tea Leaves: Predicting Judicial
Behavior in Civil and Criminal Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 12 AM. J. FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY 37, 49-50 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin, Tea Leaves].
7. On the relationship between commitment and an individual's inability to engage in "a
rational decisionmaking process regarding the acceptance of medical treatment," see 2
PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 5.40, at 332-34 (discussing A.E. v. Mitchell, 724
F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1983), which construed UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(10)(c) (Supp. 1983)).
8. See, e.g., Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.D.C. 1987) (although the
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Experts frequently testify according to their own self-referential con-
cepts of "morality," 9 and openly subvert statutory and case law crite-
ria that impose rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for
commitment I or that articulate functional standards as prerequisites
for an incompetent to stand trial finding. " Often, heuristic bias fur-
ther warps this testimony. Expert witnesses-like the rest of us-suc-
cumb to the meretricious allure of simplifying cognitive devices in
their thinking, and employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness
effect or attribution theory in their testimony.' 2
Frequently, fact-finders employ sanism in weighing and evaluat-
ing this testimony.13 Judges and jurors, consciously or unconsciously,
often rely on reductionist, prejudicial stereotypes in their decision-
making, subordinating statutory and case law standards as well as the
legitimate interests of the mentally disabled persons who are the sub-
jects of the litigation. Judges' predispositions to employ the same
sorts of heuristics as do expert witnesses further contaminate the
process. "
This combination of sanist experts and courts helps create a sys-
tem which: (1) accepts dishonest testimony unthinkingly; (2) regu-
District of Columbia Code allowed a patient to seek periodic review of commitment or
independent psychiatric evaluation, in 22 years since passage of relevant statute, not a single
patient exercised rights to statutory review).
9. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn & Julie Homey, "The Law's the Law, But Fair Is Fair": Rape
Shield Laws and Officials' Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 139
(1991) (legal "reform that contradicts deeply held beliefs may result either in open defiance of
the law or in a surreptitious attempt to modify the law"); cf. H. RICHARD UVILLER,
TEMPERED ZEAL 116-18 (1988) (police sanction perjury in cases where Supreme Court has
imposed constitutional rules that do not comport with officers' "own idea of fair play"). But
see Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from the Backseat of a Police Squad Car (reviewing
H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL) 70 B.U. L. REV. 543, 580-82 (1990) (criticizing
Uviller's view).
10. See, e.g., Perlin, Morality, supra note 3, at 135-36.
11. See, e.g., People v. Doan, 366 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (expert testified
that defendant was "out in left field" and went "bananas").
12. See, e.g., Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing
Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental Health Disability Law, 46
S.M.U. L. REV. 329 (1992); Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense:
"Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990) [hereinafter,
Perlin, Psychodynamics]; Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing
and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 123 (1980-81); see also infra text
accompanying notes 167-70.
13. See generally Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REV. 373 (1992)
(hereinafter Perlin, Sanism]; Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social
Science, and the Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 47
(1993).
14. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency
Questions?: Stripping the Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 KAN. L. REV. 957 (1990)
[hereinafter Perlin, Questions].
1993]
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larly subverts statutory and case law standards; and (3) raises
unsurmountable barriers that ensure the allegedly "therapeutically
correct" social outcome and avoidance of the worst-case-disaster-fan-
tasy, the false negative. In short, the mental disability law system
often deprives individuals of liberty disingenuously and for reasons
that have no relationship to case law or to statutes.
This aspect of the mental disability law system is astonishingly
"underconsidered" by advocates, 5 scholars and professional associa-
tions alike. Examining the way that "moral" experts testify in
"sanist" courts promotes better understanding of the extent of the
prevailing pretexts. This understanding will encourage new strategies
for confronting the underlying biases, creating a new structure, and
developing a new research agenda through which these issues can be
examined openly.
Part II of this Article briefly considers the role of pretexts in the
legal system and attempts to extract certain attributes of these pre-
texts that may apply to the forensic mental health system. Next, Part
III discusses the role of experts, both from the perspectives of heuris-
tic biases and the proferring of "moral" testimony. Then, Part IV
considers the roles of judges and jurors in mental health cases and the
impact of sanism on their decisionmaking. Finally, Part V analyzes
the ways that these factors have created a pretextual mental disability
law system and concludes by recommending a new structure for chal-
lenging heuristics, "morality," and sanism, and for dismantling
pretextuality.
II. PRETEXTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Introduction
It may sound presumptuous or nihilistic to say that our legal
system condones or encourages (or even demands) pretextuality; I do
not mean to be either. The fact that the phrase "mere pretext"
appears in over 2000 reported state and federal cases 6 suggests that,
at the least, pretexts are a matter witli which the legal system has
more than a passing familiarity.
Pretextuality is two-sided. There are areas in which courts will-
ingly accept dishonesty on the part of participants in the legal and
legislative process. On the other side of the coin, there are areas in
which courts erect insurmountable barriers so as to guard against
15. On counsel's role in general, see Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical
Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39
(1992) [hereinafter Perlin, Fatal Assumption].
16. As of a WESTLAW search conducted on February 14, 1992.
[Vol. 47:625
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what is perceived of as malingering, feigning or otherwise misusing
the legal system."' Both types of pretexts infect all areas of the legal
system, but their pernicious impact is especially problematic in the
trial of mental disability cases.
B. Explaining Pretextuality
The pretextuality paradigm testimony in "dropsy" cases fulfills a
defined police purpose and is condoned as an acceptable "necessary
evil" required to solve "the basic problems of police work."'I8 Because
the goal is perceived as both legitimate (putting criminals in jail and
preventing future crime) and necessary (as a means of mediating
against "improper" liberal rules of law imposed by the Supreme
Court),19 courts condone "deviant lies." There also is often a moral
justification offered for these actions. Because of their unique exper-
iences with criminals, police officers feel that they "know" the factual
guilt or innocence of arrestees and can therefore appropriately shape
their testimony to serve a greater social good. 20 The courts are com-
pliant "partners in crime." A recent empirical study suggests that
judges refuse to follow the law and suppress evidence due to their
"personal sense of 'justice.'" As one state's attorney pointed out,
"[w]hen judges apply the exclusionary rule, they feel they are doing
something wrong. "21
Pretextuality extends far beyond the question of police lies.
Pretextuality results from our condonation of legal fictions. Legal fic-
tions "propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of [their]
falsity" or "false statement[s] recognized as having utility" 22 are cen-
turies-old devices courts use as a means to sidestep legislation
deemed, in Blackstone's words, "so intolerably mischievous [but
which] the legislature would not then consent to repeal.
'23
Courts use these fictions to falsely interpret the true meaning of
17. Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 15, at 57 n. 113; Perlin, Morality, supra note 3, at
133-35.
18. See Barker & Carter, supra note 1, at 62-66.
19. See Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, THE NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596 (quoted
in People v. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (Sup. Ct. 1970)).
20. Peter K. Manning, Lying, Secrecy and Social Control, in POLICING: A VIEW FROM
THE STREET 238 (Peter K. Manning & John Van Maaness eds., 1978).
21. Orfield, supra note 2, at 121 (emphasis added).
22. LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967).
23. M.B.W. Sinclair, The Use of Evolution Theory in Law, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 451, 475
n.142 (1987) (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 117
[facsimile edition, published by Garland Publishing, Inc., New York and London, 1978]; see
id. at 475 (quoting Oliver R. Mitchell, The Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful or
Detrimental to its Growth, 7 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930)).
19931
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legislation through alleged legislative intent,24 or to read imaginary
unarticulated legislative assumptions into statutes in efforts to sustain
such laws by a "rationality" standard.25 Attacked by Bentham as
subterfuges for legislation, "instruments of judicial power," and "wil-
ful falsehood[s]" through which the judiciary "steal[s] legislative
power,"'26 they remain in use, sanctioned by the Supreme Court in a
wide variety of subject matters.27
The acceptance of legal fictions creates ambivalence toward con-
cepts of law and justice.28 Toleration of "sleight of hand" in the law's
theoretical bases breeds cynicism and fosters an atmosphere of sys-
temic manipulation by litigants, legislators, litigators, and courts.2 9
Now we are blind to their "evident strangeness," having become
inured to the use of such fictions.30 Such fictions, traditionally
employed in cases involving substantive questions of property and
commercial law and procedural questions of personal jurisdiction,3'
24. See, e.g., Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930)
(discussing legislative intent as a "transparent and absurd fiction"); cf Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-10 (1989) (assuming a common understanding on the part of
each Congressperson as to meaning of legislation is a "benign fiction." See generally George
A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of
Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J.
39.
25. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical
Answers, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 569, 583 (discussing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961),
upholding Sunday "blue law" retail store closings).
26. JEREMY BENTHAM, Preface for the Second Edition of A COMMENT ON THE
COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT OF GOVERNMENT 509 (1977) (written in 1822); see also
Jeremy Bentham, The Elements of The Art of Packing, as Applied to Special Juries, Particularly
in Cases of Libel Law, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 92 (John Bowring ed., 1843);
Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1990).
27. For recent examples, see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 2611
(1990) (right to die); United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 622 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(gift tax refund recoupment process); Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 202-03 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (determining partnership residency in diversity cases); Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 644 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(applying property forfeiture statute in narcotics enterprise case).
28. An inquiry into the impact of lawyers behaving pretextually with clients is beyond the
scope of this paper. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659
(1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment:
A Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (1990); David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991); Gerald B.
Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219 (1990). For a clinical
consideration, see Charles V. Ford et al., Lies and Liars: Psychiatric Aspects of Prevarication,
145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 554 (1988).
29. Stephen Wizner, What Is a Law School?, 38 EMORY L.J. 701, 705 (1989).
30. Eben Moglen, Fictional Reasoning in the Common Law Tradition: Prospects for
Historical Investigation 25, Paper presented at New York Law School Faculty Development
Seminar (Oct. 18, 1988).
31. Sinclair, supra note 23. See generally Moglen, supra note 30.
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are no longer limited to such private law questions.
Two public law examples are illustrative. The legal fiction of
"substituted judgment" is at the heart of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in the Cruzan case and in all courts' "right to die" decisionmak-
ing.a2 It also pervades the law of mental patients' right to refuse
antipsychotic drug treatment.33 In an entirely different area of the
law, the legal fiction of "territorial exclusion" drives the law that gov-
erns the detention of aliens lacking proper entry documentation. 4
One example is that of an excludable alien, who is incarcerated in an
American prison, yet who is fictively deemed not to actually be within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Legal fictions are seductive and dangerous. 35  They foster an
environment in which pretextual testimony, pretextual legislative
activity, and pretextual court decisions "no longer strike the eye" as
strange. a6 In addition to the paradigm dropsy case (one of many
aspects of constitutional criminal procedure so infected),37 damaging
32. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). See generally
Harmon, supra note 26.
33. See, e.g., Perlin, Questions, supra note 14.
34. See Mark D. Kemple, Note, Legal Fictions Mask Human Suffering: The Detention of
the Mariel Cubans Constitutional, Statutory, International Law, and Human Considerations, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 1733, 1743 (1989) (discussing Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1lth Cir.
1986) and Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982)).
35. See Harmon, supra note 26, at 15-16, 69-70.
36. Moglen, supra note 30, at 25.
37. For discussions concerning the relationship between pretextuality and the availability
of Gideon-mandated counsel, see Michael B. Mushlin, Foreword to Conference, Gideon v.
Wainwright Revisited: What Does the Right to Counsel Guarantee Today?, 10 PACE L. REV.
327, 341 (1990) (Prof. Burt Neuborne explains that the legal system functions as if Gideon
"had never been decided"); Alissa P. Worden & Robert E. Worden, Local Politics and the
Provision of Indigent Defense Counsel, 11 LAW & POL'Y REV. 401 (1989); see also James J.
Tomkovicz, The Truth About Massiah, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 641 (1990). For discussions
concerning its relationship to the availability of counsel in post-conviction death row appeals,
see William H. Brooks, Meaningful Access for Indigents on Death Row: Giarratano v. Murray
and the Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Proceedings, 43 VAND. L. REV. 569 (1990);
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Murray v. Giarratano: A Remedy Reduced to a Meaningless Ritual,
39 AM. U. L. REV. 765 (1990); Anthony Paduano & Cline A. Stafford Smith, The
Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 281 (1991). For a discussion of its relationship to adequacy of counsel
determinations and the availability of federal habeas corpus review, see John C. Jeffries &
William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas
Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (1990). For a discussion concerning its relationship to
Miranda waivers, see Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's
Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1989); see also Stephen
J. Markman & Paul Marcus, Miranda Decision Revisited: Did It Give Criminals Too Many
Rights?, 57 UMKC L. REV. 15 (1988). For a discussion of its relationship to sentencing, see
Julian V. Roberts & Anthony N. Doob, News Media Influences on Public Views of Sentencing,
14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451 (1990). For a discussion of its relationship to prosecutorial
ethics, see Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
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pretexts contaminate legal decisionmaking in a variety of civil rights,
civil liberties, and other constitutionally-grounded cases.
When a state legislator states that his introduction of a "moment
of silence" bill had nothing to do with school prayer, but merely
would insure that students had time for "private contemplation and
inspection," his statement is clearly pretextual.38 A state prejudgment
replevin statute is pretextual when it provides a discovery mechanism
not invoked by a single defendant in a 442-case sample. 39 When the
Supreme Court treats administrative rulings written after the enact-
ment of the welfare rule whose constitutionality is before the court as
"history" and "long-standing precedent," that decision is
pretextual. 40
When courts sanction "curative" jury instructions knowing full
well that the jurors have cognitively processed the damaging testi-
mony in question, that sanctioning is pretextual. 4 1 A court's reading
of testimony that depicts sexual coercion as reflecting the victim's
willing participation is pretextual.42 When courts exclude testimony
concerning the existence of a "code of silence" among police officers
deterring them from testifying in cases where other officers are
charged with using excessive force in resisting arrest cases, that exclu-
sion is pretextual.43 The Supreme Court's expansion of clear limiting
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991); see also Monroe Freedman, Police
Perjury and the Perils of Prosecutors, 130 N.J.L.J., Feb. 3, 1992, at 306; Randolph N. Jonakait,
Rebuttals and Rejoinder: Prosecutorial Behavior and Distorted Verdicts, 24 CRIM. L. BULL.
254 (1988). For a discussion concerning its relationship to plea bargaining, see Stanley A.
Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to Plea-Bargaining, 32 CRIM. L.Q. 85 (1989).
See generally Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics:
Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 591
(1990); Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to
Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537 (1990).
38. May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 1985) app'l dismissed sub nom.
Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 721 (1987).
39. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 n.14 (1972).
40. Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987).
41. See, e.g., Robert R. Calo, Joint Trials, Spillover Prejudice, and the Ineffectiveness of a
Bare Limiting Instruction, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 21, 25-26 (1985). Some studies suggest
that curative charges actually increase prejudice. See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S.
WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 108-09
(1988); Abraham R. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules
404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 175 (1989).
42. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 484-85 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); see also Kim L. Schepple, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095
(1987). For discussion on courts' pretextual misstatement of facts in general, see Anthony
D'Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court Misstates the Facts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
1313 (1990).




language of the Eleventh Amendment to bar certain federal cases
brought by citizens against their own states is pretextual.44 And when
courts fail to acknowledge that unconscious racism influences
prosecutorial and juror decisionmaking, that failure is pretextual.45
The most glaring example is McCleskey v. Kemp, which rejected
statistical evidence proffered by the defendant to demonstrate sys-
temic racial discrimination in prosecutors' decisions to seek the death
penalty and in jurors' decisions to impose capital punishment. 6 After
McCleskey, a prevailing defendant must show that the decisionmakers
"in his case acted with discriminatory purpose." We can expect that
intelligent state prosecutors can evade the proscription of this nearly-
impossible-to-fail test.
Courts are also plagued by empirical pretextuality. Courts
appear willing to accept popular myths about such alleged phenome-
non as the "litigation explosion," the frequent use of exaggerated tes-
timony in personal injury and medical malpractice cases, the
insubstantiality of most pro se prisoner writs, and the "flood" of con-
stitutional tort litigation, notwithstanding the fact that empirical real-
ity discredits each of these myths.48
44. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1890); see also Ann Althouse, When to Believe a
Legal Fiction: Federal Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1123 (1989);
George D. Brown, Has the Supreme Court Confessed Error on the Eleventh Amendment?
Revisionist Scholarship and State Immunity, 68 N.C. L. REV. 867 (1990); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Eleventh Amendment: A Comment on the Decisions
During the 1988-89 Term, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 321 (1990).
45. See, e.g., Sheri L. Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 1016 (1985); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (racial discrimination
in death penalty decisionmaking); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (racial
discrimination in prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28
(1986) (racial discrimination in jury selection in death penalty cases).
46. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
47. Id. at 292. For discussion on the teleology of courts in dealing with such social science
evidence in general, see Perlin, Morality, supra note 3, at 136-37. For discussion on its role in
mental disability cases, see generally Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 13.
48. For case law concerning the "litigation explosion," see Swidryk v. St. Michael's Med.
Ctr., 493 A.2d 641, 645 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (educational malpractice case); see
also Cunningham v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 603 A.2d 446, 450 n.10 (D.C. 1992) (time
limits on workers' compensation suits); Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 204
(E.D. Ky. 1987); Inlet Assocs. v. Harrison Inn Inlet, Inc., 596 A.2d 1049, 1068 (Md. 1991)
(Bell, J., dissenting) (third party action based on attorney-client advice). Compare John H.
Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975) and Bayless Manning,
Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 767 (1977) (setting out myths) with
William L.F. Feltstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631 (1981) and Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 38-39 (1983) and Randy M. Mastro,
The Myth of the Litigation Explosion, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 199 (1991) and Henry J. Reske,
Was There a Liability Crisis?, 75 ABA J. 46 (1989) (setting out reality). For an excellent
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C. Pretexts and Mental Disability Cases
The relationship between empirical pretextuality and the trial of
mental disability cases is an important and profound one. Pretextual
devices, such as condoning perjured testimony, distorting readings of
trial testimony, subordinating statistically significant social science
data, and enacting prophylactic civil rights laws that have absolutely
no "real world" impact, similarly dominate the mental disability law
landscape. These devices usually flow from the same motives that
inspire similar behavior by courts and legislatures in other cases.
Again, a few examples illustrate this point. Although the Dis-
trict of Columbia Code contains a provision that patients can seek
either periodic review of their commitment or an independent psychi-
atric evaluation, in the first 22 years following the law's passage, not a
single patient exercised his right to statutory review. 49 While Attor-
ney General William French Smith told Congress that the insanity
analysis of the social implications of courts' caseload controls, see Nancy Levit, The Caseload
Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 321 (1989).
For a discussion of testimony in medical malpractice cases, see Jones v. United States, 720
F. Supp. 355, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Compare Deborah Kaplan, Courtroom Indignities, CAL.
LAW., Aug. 1985, at 72 and Paul R. Lees-Haley, Personal Injury Malingering, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Feb. 1986, at 28 (setting out myths) with Daniel Kramer, The Harvard Study: An
Analysis, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 7, 1990, at 1 (setting out reality). See generally James D. Zirin, Is the
Malpractice Cure to 'Kill All the Lawyers'?, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 8, 1990, at 2. For a discussion of
the role of symbolism in this inquiry, see F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians' Point of View
Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of
"Tort Reform," 23 GA. L. REV. 295 (1989) (same).
For case law concerning prisoner writs, see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 584 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment) ("It is common knowledge that prisoner actions occupy a
disproportionate amount of the time and energy of the federal judiciary."). Compare Samuel J.
Brakel, Prison Reform Litigation: Has the Revolution Gone Too Far?, 49 CORRECTIONS
TODAY 160 (1987) (setting out myths) with Dean J. Champion, Some Recent Trends in Civil
Litigation by Federal and State Prison Inmates, 52 FED. PROBATION 43 (1988) (setting out
reality) and Jim Thomas, The "Reality" of Prisoner Litigation: Repackaging the Data, 15
NEW ENG. J. CRIM. ON CIV. CONFINEMENT 27, 42-44 (1989) (same).
For case law concerning constitutional tort litigation, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,
23 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (prediction that decision expanding tort liability will "harass
state and local officials ... in our already overburdened courts"); cf. Theodore Eisenberg &
Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641
(1987); Ann J. Gellis, Legislative Reforms of Governmental Tort Liability: Overreacting to
Minimal Evidence, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 375 (1990) (setting out reality). For the Supreme Court's
most recent characterization of the "floodgates" argument, see Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S.
Ct. 995 (1992) (reasoning that decision allowing assaulted prisoner to maintain § 1983 action
"does not open the floodgates for filings by other inmates"). For expressions of judicial
concern about constitutional tort expansion opening the "floodgates" to potential litigants, see
United States v. Weissberger, 951 F.2d 392, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (appealability of basis for
competency evaluation); Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240, 1244 (7th Cir. 1984) (constitutional
tort action by police officer over employment matter).
49. Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.D.C. 1987); cf In Interest of C.W., 453
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defense "allows so many persons to commit crimes of violence," one of
his top aides candidly told a federal judicial conference that the
number of insanity defense cases was, statistically, "probably insignifi-
cant."' When a state enacts a new statutory scheme to "treat" sex
offenders, but fails to hire any professionals experienced in the provi-
sion of such treatment, that new statute is pretextual. 5"
In a case that turned on the question of whether a defendant had
the requisite specific intent to attempt a bank robbery, a federal dis-
trict court judge refused to allow a county jail psychiatrist to testify
that he prescribed antipsychotic medications for the defendant for a
particular purpose and a particular length of time. The judge rea-
soned that such testimony "might be interfering with the treatment of
[other] prisoners in jails because [they] might ask for more drugs to
create the impression they need more drugs."' 52 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed this decision as "not manifestly erroneous," even though
there was no evidence anywhere in the case that spoke to this issue.53
Finally, and more globally, courts and commentators regularly
assume that vigorous, independent, advocacy-focused counsel is now
available to all mentally disabled litigants, in spite of an empirical
reality that, in almost every jurisdiction, is totally to the contrary.54
N.W.2d 806, 809 (N.D. 1990) (rejecting patient's argument that discharge hearings were "rare
occurrence[s]").
50. Perlin, Morality, supra note 3, at 134 (quoting Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise:
The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded In Its Own Right and Successfully
Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 980 (1987) and
Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, Ill
F.R.D. 91, 225 (1985)).
51. See John Q. La Fond, The New "Sexually Violent Predator" Law-America's Unique
Sexual Offender Commitment Law 8, Paper presented at the American College of Forensic
Psychiatry's Tenth Annual Symposium, San Francisco, CA (April 1992) (discussing WASH.
REV. CODE § 71.09 et seq. (1970)); see also Brian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington's New
Sexual Predator Commitment System: An Unconstitutional Law and An Unwise Policy Choice,
14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105 (1990).
52. United States v. Still, 857 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1060
(1989).
53. Id. In another case, a testifying doctor conceded that he may have "hedged" in earlier
testimony (as to whether an insanity acquittee could be released) "because he did not want to
be criticized should (the defendant] be released and then commit a criminal act." Francois v.
Henderson, 850 F.2d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 1988).
54. See Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 15, at 40, 49, 54. Compare In re Micah S.,
243 Cal. Rptr. 756, 760 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (Brauer, J., concurring) ("As in other areas
where counsel is furnished at public expense, every petition, however meritorious, is vigorously
challenged. 'Cherchez l'avocat' is the battle cry of every appellate lawyer today.") (parental
rights termination case) with Elliott Andalman & David L. Chambers, Effective Counsel for
Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43, 72
(1974) (counsel was so inadequate in sample studied that patients' chances for release from
hospital were enhanced if no lawyer was present) and George E. Dix, Acute Psychiatric
Hospitalization of the Mentally III in the Metropolis: An Empirical Study, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q.
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Police officers perjure themselves in dropsy cases "to ensure that
criminals do not get off on 'technicalities,' "" and trial judges con-
done such behavior so as to "mediate the draconian effect of imposed-
from-above constitutional decisions, "56 such as Mapp v. Ohio. In the
same way, expert witnesses in civil commitment cases often impose
their own self-referential concept of "morality" to insure that patients
who "really need treatment" remain institutionalized. 7  Judges
accept this testimony in light of their own "instrumental, functional,
normative and philosophical" dissatisfaction" with decisions such as
O'Connor v. Donaldson,59 Jackson v. Indiana6° and Lessard v.
Schmidt.61 Just as judges, including former Chief Justice Burger,
express doubt that police testimony in dropsy cases requires special
scrutiny,62 they also express astonishment at the assertion that expert
testimony in involuntary civil commitment cases may be factually
inaccurate.63
485, 540 (only two of 1700 contested cases resulted in patient's release). See generally 2
PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 8.11, at 783-86; Michael L. Perlin & Robert L.
Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (1982).
55. Barker & Carter, supra note 1, at 69.
56. Perlin, Morality, supra note 3, at 134; see also Orfield, supra note 2, at 121 (judges
refuse to suppress evidence because of: (1) their personal "sense of justice"; (2) the fear of
adverse publicity; and (3) the fear that such a decision might lead to re-election difficulties).
For a rare candid judicial articulation of this position, see Rogers v. State, 332 So. 2d 165, 167
(Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (quoting trial judge, "In Alabama we had sensible [criminal
procedure] rules until the damn Supreme Court went crazy."), cert. denied, 332 So. 2d 168
(Ala. 1976).
57. See William 0. McCormick, Involuntary Commitment in Ontario: Some Barriers to
the Provision of Proper Care, 124 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 715, 717 (1981).
58. Perlin, Morality, supra note 3, at 134.
59. 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (right to liberty).
60. 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (application of due process clause to commitments following
incompetency to stand trial findings).
61. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (application of substantive and procedural due
process clauses to involuntary civil commitment process).
62. Bush v. United States, 375 F.2d 602, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("[I]t would be a dismal
reflection on society to say that when the guardians of its security are called to testify in court
under oath, their testimony must be viewed with suspicion."). But see People v. McMurty, 314
N.Y.S.2d 194, 197 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970) (Younger, J.) (disagreeing with Justice Burger's
point of view); Orfield, supra note 2. McMurty is discussed in Comment, Police Perjury in
Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases.: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971).
63. Opinion testimony by psychiatrists is "routinely and unquestioningly accepted" at
involuntary civil commitment hearings. Marilyn Hammond, Predictions of Dangerousness in
Texas: Psychotherapists' Conflicting Duties, Their Potential Liability, and Possible Solutions, 12
ST. MARY'S L.J. 141, 150 n.71 (1980); see also In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 902-03 (D.C. 1991)
(asking "Where else would the doctor go for such information?" in response to a patient's
argument that it was violation of the hearsay rules for witness to base his medical conclusion
on factual information given him by the patient's relatives). For discussion on the application
of the hearsay rules to the involuntary civil commitment process in general, see 1 PERLIN,
[Vol. 47:625
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In addition, courts fantasize about feared pretextuality in cases
where anecdotal myths prevail or where unconscious values
predominate."M For instance, the North Carolina Supreme Court
deemed a sheriff's lay opinion that a potentially incompetent-to-
stand-trial defendant learned how to feign mental illness after speak-
ing to (presumably wily and sophisticated) state prisoners during his
pre-trial incarceration more persuasive than the uncontradicted
clinical testimony that the defendant was schizophrenic, mentally
retarded, and suffering from acute pathological intoxication.65  The
fear that defendants will "fake" the insanity defense to escape punish-
ment continues to paralyze the legal system in spite of an impressive
array of empirical evidence revealing: (1) the minuscule number of
such cases; (2) the ease with which trained clinicians are usually able
to "catch" malingering in such cases; (3) the inverse greater likeli-
hood that defendants, even at grave peril to their life, will more likely
try to convince examiners that they're "not crazy"; (4) the high risk
in pleading the insanity defense (leading to statistically significant
greater prison terms meted out to unsuccessful insanity pleaders); and
(5) the fact that most of the small number of insanity pleaders who
are successful remain in maximum security facilities for a longer
period than they would have if convicted of the underlying criminal
indictment.66 None of this empirically-grounded evidence has had
any significant impact on fact-finders in subsequent cases.
In short, mental disability law is replete with textbook examples
of both conscious and unconscious pretextuality in the law. This
pretextuality is reflected both consciously (in the reception and
privileging of "moral" testimony that flaunts legislative criteria) and
unconsciously (in the use of heuristic devices in decisionmaking, and
in the application of sanist attitudes toward such decisions).
CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 3.31, at 291-96; see also United States v. Charters, 863
F.2d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
Appellate courts rarely consider whether mental disability law proceedings elicit or
suppress "the truth." For thoughtful and conflicting visions, compare the majority opinion in
In re Commitment of Edward S., 570 A.2d 917 (N.J. 1990), to Judge Handler's concurrence
(statutory mandate requiring that involuntary civil commitment hearings be held in camera
deemed inapplicable to cases involving insanity acquittees).
64. See Perlin, Morality, supra note 3, at 134.
65. See State v. Willard, 234 S.E.2d 587, 591-93 (N.C. 1977).
66. Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 648-55, 713-21 (1989-90) [hereinafter
Perlin, Unpacking].
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III. MORALITY AND HEURISTICS: THE ROLE OF EXPERTS
A. Introduction
Expert testimony is the key to both the involuntary civil commit-
ment and the incompetency to stand trial inquiries. While lay testi-
mony is admissible at both types of proceedings (and may actually be
dispositive in the criminal context),67 two critical questions turn,
definitively, on the opinon of experts: (1) is a patient mentally ill, and,
by nature of his mental illness, dangerous to self or others; and
(2) does a defendant have a functional ability to communicate, consult
and cooperate with counsel in a criminal trial.6 If we assume that
experts are "expert" in these areas-that is, that they have expertise,
knowledge and training beyond the experiences of lay persons, mak-
ing it appropriate for them to testify as to their opinion on an ultimate
legal question69-then we have a right to expect that their testimony
is informed by their training, scholarship, experience, and scientific
inquiry. Bias, prejudice, anecdote, or self-referential "ordinary com-
mon sense" ("OCS") should not taint their testimony. 0
This expectation has been the subject of little scholarly or judicial
investigation. Experts' testimony is premised on individual value sys-
tems (i.e., the expert "knows" what's "really best" for the patient),7 I
or on cognitive distortions (i.e., the last time that the expert recom-
mended release at an involuntary civil commitment review hearing,
the patient subsequently was found homeless in the town's rail sta-
tion, and the local press coverage focused on the hapless expert's trial
testimony as the dispositive antecedent "cause" of the subsequent
event),72 and, as a result, one of the most basic and important linch-
67. See, e.g., Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 1990); Wallace v. Kemp,
757 F.2d 1102 (11th Cir. 1985); Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984).
68. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 n.24 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
(involuntary civil commitment); James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 455 (1985) (incompetency to stand trial).
69. For a recent discussion in the involuntary civil commitment context, see In re Melton,
597 A.2d 892 (D.C. 1991). See generally GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 483 (2d ed. 1987).
70. See generally Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical
Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (1988). For discussion on the role of
OCS in insanity defense cases, see Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12, at 24-25 n.99 (in
criminal procedure context, OCS presupposes two self-evident truths: (1) everyone knows how
to assess an individual's behavior; and (2) everyone knows when to blame someone for doing
wrong). The criticism is not of true "common sense" but of self-referential pronouncements
made under the guise of being "common sensical," a kind offaux common sense.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 88-94.
72. See, e.g., Perlin, Morality, supra note 3, at 137; see also Robyn M. Dawes, Experience
and Validity of Clinical Judgment.- The Illusory Correlation, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 457, 459-60,
464-66 (1989). For a discussion concerning psychiatric fear of underprediction of
[Vol. 47:625
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pins of the forensic mental health system comes seriously loose from
its moorings.
In fact, this is a significant possibility. In order to understand the
dimensions of the problem, two related and overlapping issues arise:
(1) the extent to which mental health professionals' concept of moral-
ity affects their trial testimony; and (2) the extent to which they fall
prey to heuristic distortions in their testimony.
B. On Morality
1. EXPERTISE AND SOCIAL VALUES
I begin with the proposition that the phrase "neutral expert" is
an oxymoron.7 3 Bernard Diamond, for one, believed that a witness'
unconscious identification with a "side" of a legal battle or his more
conscious identification with a value system or ideological leanings
may lead to "innumerable subtle distortions and biases in his testi-
mony that spring from this wish to triumph."74 Even demurring to
Diamond's psychoanalytic speculations, subsequent behavioral
research demonstrates that the expert's opinion in insanity defense
cases and civil psychic trauma trials positively correlates with the
expert's underlying political ideology."
In a whole range of forensic mental health fact settings, social
bias "infects and hides behind scientific judgments."76 Ben Bursten
dangerousness as a possible animator of forensic behavior, see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 922 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun., J., dissenting); see also Francois v. Henderson, 850 F.2d 231
(5th Cir. 1988) (discussed supra note 53).
73. See Jeffrey J. Parker, Note, Contingent Expert Witness Fees: Access and Legitimacy, 64
S. CAL. L. REV. 1363, 1385-86 (1991); see also R.J. Gerber, Victory vs. Truth: The Adversary
System and Its Ethics, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 11 (1987); John M. Sink, The Unused Power of a
Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witness, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 197 (1956).
74. Bernard L. Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES CRIM.
PSYCHODYNAMICS 221, 223 (1959). See generally Seymour L. Halleck, The Ethical Dilemmas
of Forensic Psychiatry: A Utilitarian Approach, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 279
(1984); Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic Relationships, 9
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111, 116-17 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin, Power].
75. See Robert J. Homant et al., Ideology as a Determinant of View on the Insanity
Defense, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 3, 7 (1986); Robert J. Homant & Daniel B. Kennedy, Definitions of
Mental Illness as a Factor in Expert Witnesses' Judgments of Insanity, 31 CORRECTIVE & SOC.
PSYCHIATRY J. BEHAV. TECH. METHODS & THERAPY 125 (1985); Robert J. Homant &
Daniel B. Kennedy, Judgment of Legal Insanity as a Function of Attitude Toward the Insanity
Defense, 8 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 67 (1986); Robert J. Homant & Daniel B. Kennedy,
Subjective Factors in the Judgment of Insanity, 14 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 38 (1987)
[hereinafter Homant & Kennedy, Subjective Factors]. But see Richard Rogers & Charles P.
Ewing, Ultimate Opinion Proscriptions: A Cosmetic Fix and a Plea for Empiricism, 13 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 357, 369 (1989) (questioning the universal applicability of Homant and
Kennedy's conclusions).
76. Peggy C. Davis, Law, Science, and History: Reflections Upon In The Best Interests of
the Child, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1096,1107 (1988) (reviewing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AT., IN THE
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argues that any decision as to whether a certain behavior was a prod-
uct of mental illness is not a matter of scientific expertise, "but a mat-
ter of social policy."7 This evidence becomes even more disturbing in
light of other research suggesting that even experienced forensic
mental health professionals are significantly mistaken about the sub-
stantive insanity defense standards actually employed in the jurisdic-
tions in which they practice and testify. 78 This becomes yet more
problematic when witnesses testify as to conclusions of law, either in
defining the appropriate legal standard for forensic cases, or in con-
cluding whether a patient meets that legal standard. 9
Other evidence suggests that variables such as race, sex, culture,
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986)); see also Homant & Kennedy, Subjective Factors,
supra note 75, at 42 (as noted by Benjamin M. and Dorthea D. Braginsky, varying a patient's
political philosophy and his degree of deference toward interviewers significantly affects
clinicians' judgment of severity of patient's mental illness).
77. BEN BURSTEN, BEYOND PSYCHIATRIC EXPERTISE 167 (1984); see also Mary A.
Deitchman et al., Self-Selection Factors in the Participation of Mental Health Professionals in
Competency for Execution Evaluations, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 299 (1991) (personal
combination of attitude toward capital punishment and attribution for criminal responsibility
affects forensic examiners' decisions as to whether or not to participate in competency for
execution evaluations).
A National Institute of Mental Health advisory committee report submitted in the
aftermath of the Hinckley acquittal conceded Bursten's argument by acknowledging that, "in
controversial cases," the federal government could "be counted upon to oppose any
conditional release recommendation." Final Report of the National Institute of Mental Health
Ad Hoc Forensic Advisory Panel, 12 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 77, 96 (1988)
(emphasis added).
78. Richard Rogers et al., Forensic Psychiatrists' and Psychologists' Understanding of
Insanity: Misguided Expertise?, 33 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 691 (1988). See generally Bruce J.
Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 83, 125 n. 180
(David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991). For a discussion concerning clinician
confusion about applicable competency standards, see THOMAS GRISSo, EVALUATING
COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 8-9 (1980); Norman G.
Poythress, Mental Health Expert Testimony: Current Problems, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 201,
207 (1977). For a discussion of the ways that clinical evaluators mistakenly conflate
incompetency and insanity standards, see GRISSO, supra, at 8-9; RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN
L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 16-17, 50, 83-91 (1980). For the most recent
research, see William G. Johnson et al., The Relationship of Competency to Stand Trial and
Criminal Responsibility, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 169 (1990). For the ways that courts
continue to confuse the underlying concepts, see Kirk v. State, 308 S.E.2d 592, 598 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1983), aff'd, 311 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 1984). See generally infra part IV.B.2.
79. See People v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 200, 205-06 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (diminished
capacity); People v. Doan, 366 N.W.2d 593 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (incompetency to stand
trial); People v. Matulonis, 320 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (same); People v.
Drossart, 297 N.W.2d 863, 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (insanity defense) (defining standard);
State v. Bennett, 345 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (La. 1977) (Dennis, J., on rehearing) (competency to
plead guilty) (legal conclusion). But cf State v. Widenhouse, 582 So. 2d 1374, 1385-86 (La.
Ct. App. 1991) (not error to allow state's witness to inform jury of legal insanity standard),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1274 (1992).
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gender preference, physical attractiveness and economic status signifi-
cantly affect expert testimony."0 Some other research suggests that
less secure mental health professionals are preoccupied with eliciting
pathology as a demonstration of their own expertise. Their compe-
tence as examiners may rest on their ability to demonstrate incompe-
tency on the part of the defendant.8" Finally, professionals with
different education and training rely on different sets of data in doing
forensic evaluations.
8 2
In short, both social ideology and misinformed, inaccurate infor-
mation as to the substantive tests against which defendants' behavior
must be measured often drive experts' conclusions. Most impor-
tantly, this tableau seemingly has arisen with little or no awareness on
the part of the forensic experts themselves. Thus, when Michael Saks
charged that such witnesses act like "imperial experts" who install
themselves as "temporary monarch[s]" by replacing a "social prefer-
80. See, e.g., Martha L. Bruce et al., Poverty and Psychiatric Status, 48 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 470 (1991) (on the relationship between psychiatric disorder and social class);
Gerald Cooke et al., A Comparison of Blacks and Whites Committed for Evaluation of
Competency to Stand Trial on Criminal Charges, 2 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 319, 319 (1974)
(psychopathology overestimated in black defendants); Kirk Heilbrun et al., Comparing
Females Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, Convicted, and Civilly Committed in Florida, 1977-
1984, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 295 (1988) (on relationship between gender, age and race and
insanity defense success); Sarah Rosenfeld, Race Differences in Involuntary Hospitalization:
Psychiatric vs. Labeling Perspectives, 25 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 14 (1984) (more coercive
conditions under which nonwhites enter treatment accounts for greater involuntary
hospitalization rate); Sarah Rosenfeld, Sex Roles and Societal Reactions to Mental Illness: The
Labeling of "Deviant" Deviance, 23 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 18 (1982) [hereinafter
Rosenfeld, Sex Roles] (in commitment context, both men and women treated more harshly
when their deviant behavior is inconsistent with traditional sex role norms); see also Ellen C.
Wertlieb, Individuals With Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System: A Review of the
Literature, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 332, 333 (1991); Leslie A. Zebrowitz & Susan M.
McDonald, The Impact of Litigants' Baby-Facedness and Attractiveness on Adjudications in
Small Claims Court, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603 (1991) (on harsh societal treatment of the
physically unattractive); Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to
Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035
(1987).
A recent study finding no racial bias in the incompetency to stand trial evaluation stage
nonetheless speculated that bias may still exist at the referral stage, questioning whether
nonwhites must exhibit greater impairment to warrant referral for a competency evaluation.
See Robert A. Nicholson & William G. Johnson, Prediction of Competency to Stand Trial:
Contribution of Demographics, Type of Offense, Clinical Characteristics, and Psycholegal
Ability, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 287, 295 (1991).
81. A. Louis McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency for Trial and Mental
Illness: Review and Preview, 49 B.U. L. REV. 46, 52-53 (1969); see also Saleem A. Shah,
Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 224 (1978) (standard rule of medical decisions is, "When in doubt, suspect
illness").
82. Jean C. Beckham et al., Decision Making and Examiner Bias in Forensic Expert
Recommendations for Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 79 (1989).
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ence expressed through the law and legal process with [their] own
preferences,"8'3 the expert community did not offer heated denials.
Rather, the implications of this tacit reliance on self-referential
"morality" remain virtually unnoticed. This, of course, contrasts
sharply with the way that scholars and judges regularly scrutinize and
weigh morality value choices in a wide variety of other legal contexts,
and determine whether the decisionmaking processes in those cases
are pretextual 
4
2. EXPERTISE AND INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
When courts and legislatures significantly tightened involuntary
civil commitment ("ICC") criteria in the early 1970s,85 a large
number of prominent mental health professionals responded nega-
tively to what they saw as "turf invasions" on the part of the courts
83. Michael J. Saks, Expert Witnesses, Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts, 14
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291, 294 (1990); see also, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior,
Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 619 (1978)
(experts should not "propound commonsense factual or moral judgments as scientific ones").
The same question can arise in a more benign setting. Paul Appelbaum noted how, given
the "extremely nebulous" standards set out in social security law, there is a "strong
temptation" for sympathetic evaluators to call a patient disabled "even if that requires
'twisting the rules of justice and fairness.'" Paul S. Appelbaum, Psychiatric Ethics in the
Courtroom, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 225, 228 (1984).
84. See Regina Austin, Sapphire Boundl, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539, 550-51 (discussing
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 697 (8th
Cir. 1987) (no violation of discrimination law for Girls Club to fire unmarried pregnant
employee under club's "negative role model" policy)); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber,
Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 818 (1990)
(critiquing pretextual nature of case law that incorporates double standard of sexual morality
in dealing with "the tortious consequences of adultery"); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths
and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L. J.
1177, 1209 (1990) (critiquing the pretextual nature of sexual harassment decisions for
reinforcing a "boys will be boys" ideology); Lawrence M. Friedman, Two Faces of Law, 1984
Wis. L. REV. 13, 21-23 (critiquing pretextual nature of prostitution control law); Thomas B.
Griffen, Note, Zoning Away the Evil of Alcohol, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1405 (1988)
(criticizing zoning laws as "pretext[s]" for suppressing adult entertainment); David L. Neal,
Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 203, 217 (1988) ("Laws regulating morality are manifestly
designed to subjugate women."); Wojciech Sadurski, Conventional Morality and Judicial
Standards, 73 VA. L. REV. 339, 364 (1987) (criticizing Justice Marshall's death penalty
jurisprudence as "pretextual" and as a "disguise for his own substantive morality"); Laura E.
Santilli & Michael C. Roberts, Custody Decisions in Alabama Before and After the Abolition of
the Tender Years Doctrine, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 123 (1990) (critiquing pretextual nature
of child custody laws); see also Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148 (1st
Cir. 1990) (finding stated reasons for discharging bank employee for violating company rule
requiring "public morality" a pretextual "cover" for discriminatory treatment of female
employee).
85. See 1 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, §§ 2.09-.11. See generally David B.
Wexler, The Structure of Civil Commitment: Patterns, Pressures, and Interactions in Mental
Health Legislation, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1983).
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and legislatures.8 6 Dr. Paul Chodoff counseled expert witnesses
against "succumb[ing] to prevailing fashion" (that is, more restrictive
commitment standards) if acquiescence was not in their patients'
"best interests." 7 Chodoff recommended exercising "wise and benev-
olent paternalism," leading to a "moral judgment" that hospitaliza-
tion is appropriate for patients "incapable of voluntarily accepting
help," in spite of laws rejecting "need of treatment" as a commitment
standard. 8 Even more pointedly, after considering Ontario's
amended mental health law aimed at making involuntary civil com-
mitment standards more stringent, a prominent local psychiatrist
argued that the new law had little empirical weight: "Doctors will
continue to certify those whom they really believe should be certified;
they will merely learn a new language." 9 The subsequent empirical
data partially suggests that this prediction came true.90 Other studies
86. Walter Reich, Psychiatric Diagnosis as an Ethical Problem, in PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS 72
(Sidney Bloch & Paul Chodoffeds., 1981). See also PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5,
§ 2.23A, at 32-36 (Supp. 1992). This is not the only area of legal regulation inspiring charges
of "turf invasion" by organized psychiatry. Compare Lawson R. Wulsin et al., Unexpected
Clinical Features of the Tarasoff Decision: The Therapeutic Alliance and the "Duty to Warn",
140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 601, 601 (1983) ("[T]he clinician... is understandably disturbed by
the concept of therapeutic approaches being disruptively influenced from remote judicial
benches.") with Richard J. Bonnie, Professional Liability and the Quality of Mental Health
Care, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 229, 236 (1988) (Tarasoff litigation "has made a
beneficial contribution to [patients'] quality of care."). Compare Arnold S. Relman, The
Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 233 (1978) (courts incapable of
handling "right to die" cases; judicial involvement impedes medical decisionmaking) with
Charles H. Baron, Medical Paternalism and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Relman, 4 AM.
J.L. & MED. 337, 340 (1979) (court determination of such questions not a " 'gratuitous
encroachment' on the domain of medical expertise").
87. Paul Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally I11, 133 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 494, 501 (1976).
88. Id.; see Louis McGarry & Paul Chodoff, The Ethics of Involuntary Hospitalization, in
PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS 203, 211-12 (Sidney Bloch & Paul Chodoff eds., 1984); Paul Chodoff,
Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Il as a Moral Issue, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 384,
388 (1984). See generally Loretta M. Kopelman, On the Evaluative Nature of Competency and
Capacity Judgments, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 309, 320-22 (1990) (discussing moral
paternalism on part of such psychiatrists). On the parallel question of judicial involvement in
patients' decisions to seek voluntary hospitalization, see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
127-28 (1990) (procedural due process requires some judicial inquiry into patient's competency
to consent to voluntary hospitalization prior to admission of patient on voluntary basis). For
criticism on therapeutic jurisprudential grounds, see generally Winick, supra note 78.
89. McCormick, supra note 57, at 717; cf Mark R. Munetz et al., Modernization of a
Mental Health Act: I. Commitment Patterns, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 83, 85
(1980) (after legislative reform, "do real changes result, or do people simply find new ways to
do what they did before within the framework of a different law?").
90. Studies of the impact of Ontario's reform laws concluded that mental health legislation
had "little effect" on commitment practices. B.A. Martin & K.D. Cheung, Civil Commitment
Trends in Ontario: The Effect of Legislation on Clinical Practice, 30 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 259
(1985); see also R. Michael Bagby, The Effects of Legislative Reform on Admission Rates to
Psychiatric Units of General Hospitals, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 383 (1987). For a
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similarly confirm that involuntary civil commitment decisionmaking
simply "may not rest on statutory grounds."'"
It may not rest on clinically coherent grounds either. Doctors
recommend hospitalization "whenever they are in doubt about a
patient's potential for suicide 'since it is always better to err on the
side of safety,' "92 notwithstanding empirical research concluding that
it is not possible to predict suicide, even among high-risk groups of in-
patients.93 This type of decisionmaking blocks access to any inquiry
discussion concerning clinician adherence to the legislatively-abandoned criteria, see Stewart
Page, Civil Commitment- Operational Definition of New Criteria, 26 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 419
(1981). In some jurisdictions, the involuntary civil commitment rate actually increased
following the supposed tightening of criteria. See R. Michael Bagby et al., Effects of Mental
Health Legislative Reform in Ontario, 28 CAN. PSYCHOL. 21 (1987). See generally R. Michael
Bagby & Leslie Atkinson, The Effects of Legislative Reform on Civil Commitment Admission
Rates: A Critical Analysis, 6 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 45 (1988); R. Michael Bagby, The Indigenous
Paraprofessional and Involuntary Civil Commitment: A Return to Community Values, 25 CAN.
PSYCHOL. 167 (1984) [hereinafter Bagby, Community Values]. Studies elsewhere report
similar results. See, e.g., William H. Fisher et al., How Flexible Are Our Civil Commitment
Statutes?, 39 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 711, 712 (1988) (when legislation sought to
expand bases of commitment, commitment rates increased in certain vicinages by nearly 100%
before the date that the new act was to have gone into effect); Munetz et al., supra note 89, at
92 ("remarkably little, if any, change found in the clinical characteristics of the patients
committed") (emphasis added); Glenn L. Pierce et al., The Impact of Public Policy and
Publicity on Admissions to State Mental Health Hospitals, I1 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 41
(1986).
91. Judith S. Thompson & Joel W. Ager, An Experimental Analysis of the Civil
Commitment Recommendations of Psychologists and Psychiatrists, 6 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 119, 120
(1988) (discussing considerations such as available bed space and potential liabilities); see also
Virginia A. Hiday, Dangerousness of Civil Commitment Candidates: A Six-Month Follow-Up,
14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 551, 551 (1990) [hereinafter Hiday, Six-Month] (little dangerousness
found on part of involuntary civil commitment candidates in six months following hospital
release); Virginia A. Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures: An Empirical Study in the
Courtroom, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 651 (1977) (only 24% of sample of committed patients met
statutory criteria); Virginia A. Hiday & Lynn N. Smith, Effects of the Dangerousness Standard
in Civil Commitment, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 433, 441 (1987) (no allegations of dangerous
behavior listed on affidavits in support of one-third of all applications for admission supposedly
filed under dangerousness standard); Stewart Page & John L. Firth, Civil Commitment
Practices in 1977: Troubled Semantics and/or Troubled Psychiatry, 24 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY
329, 330 (1979) (80-90% of filed commitment forms failed to meet legal criteria); R.A. Richert
& A.H. Moyes, Reasons for Involuntary Commitment in Manitoba and Ontario, 28 CAN. J.
PSYCHIATRY 358, 358 (1983) (reporting similar 80-90% failure rates).
In the most recent investigation, researchers found that psychiatrists failed to recommend
commitment for 26% of a mock sample study that met the applicable legal criteria, and
recommended commitment for 20% of the sample that did not meet the criteria. R. Michael
Bagby et al., Decision Making in Psychiatric Civil Commitment: An Experimental Analysis,
148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 28, 32 (1991).
92. Norman G. Poythress, Mental Health Expert Testimony: Current Problems, 5 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 201, 207 (1977) (quoting Itamar Salamon, Evaluation of Suicidal Patients,
24 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 65 (1974)).
93. Rise B. Goldstein et al., The Prediction of Suicide. Sensitivity, Specificity, and
Predictive Value of a Multivariate Model Applied to Suicide Among 1906 Patients With Affective
Disorders, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 418 (1991). See generally 3 PERLIN, CIVIL &
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as to whether the patient has social support in the community, a fac-
tor that is frequently associated with positive mental health
outcomes.
94
There is a "flip side" to this arrogation of morality. Employing
the rankest form of passive-aggressive behavior," some mental health
professionals have advised families to put their mentally ill relatives
out on the streets where they will either find life so difficult that they
will accept treatment or will deteriorate to the point at which there
will no longer be any question as to their eligibility for involuntary
civil commitment. 96 To suggest that this stands both medical ethics
and the legal system on their heads belabors the obvious.
What does this mean? Do the leaders of the forensic profession
ask forensic witnesses to lie, just as police officers frequently do in
dropsy cases, for a greater social value? That social interest purport-
edly involves insuring that patients who "really" need "help" receive
it in spite of statutes and court decisions that require proof of danger-
ous behavior as a prerequisite to involuntary institutionalization.97
This is happening both explicitly and implicitly.
It seems that this arrogation of morality works in other direc-
tions as well. Susan Reed and Dan Lewis' recent study of voluntary
hospital admission patterns at several Chicago community mental
health centers reveals that staff workers will deviate from their rou-
tine behavior and select certain patients for special attention (in the
admission and treatment processes) if the workers feel that the spe-
CRIMINAL, supra note 5, §§ 12.19-.23, at 57-66; ROBERT I. SIMON & ROBERT L. SADOFF,
PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE: CASES AND COMMENTS FOR CLINICIANS 121-56 (1992).
94. Hiday, Six-Month, supra note 91, at 564 (citing findings reported in V.A. Hiday & T.L.
Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina Experience With Outpatient Commitment: A Critical
Appraisal, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 215-32 (1987)); see R. Jay Turner, Social Support as a
Contingency in Psychological Well-Being, 22 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 357, 357 (1981).
95. See, e.g., Julie M. Zito et al., One Year Under Rivers: Drug Refusal in a New York
State Psychiatric Facility, 12 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 295 (1989); Phillip Leaf, Wyatt v.
Stickney: Assessing the Impact in Alabama, 28 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 351, 354
(1977).
96. David Wexler, Grave Disability and Family Therapy: The Therapeutic Potential of
Civil Libertarian Commitment Codes, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT 165, 182 n.100 (David Wexler ed., 1990); see also John J. Enismnger &
Thomas D. Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the Civil Commitment Hearing: An
Unexplained Potential, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 245, 250 (discussing
decision by doctors to remove patients from medication prior to involuntary civil commitment
hearings "so that overt symptomatology will reappear"); cf In re Burton, 464 N.E.2d 530,
537-38 (Ohio 1984) (error for court to order defendant withdrawn from all psychotropic
medication during incompetency to stand trial evaluation period).
97. Cf Spohn & Homey, supra note 9, at 139 ("[A] reform that contradicts deeply held
beliefs may result either in open defiance of the law or in a surreptitious attempt to modify the
law." (citing ROBERT T. NAKAMURA & FRANK SMALLWOOD, THE POLITICS OF POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION (1980))).
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cific patients in question are "worth it."98
This research is troubling for two overlapping reasons. First, the
assessment as to who is "worth it" is easily distorted by prejudices
and overgeneralizations about race, sex, sexual preference, ethnicity
and social class. Although it might optimally reflect an expert evalua-
tion of which patient is most likely to live a productive life "on the
outside" free from further behavioral episodes that might require rein-
stitutionalization, there is no reason to expect that this is the type of
normative decisionmaking that informs the meaning of "worth." We
know, for instance, that pathology is frequently overestimated in sam-
ples in which individuals do not comport with publicly-acceptable sex
role behavior. 99 We can only speculate as to the extent to which this
sort of attitude "spills over" to evaluations of patient worth.1°°
Second, the "gatekeepers" in the Chicago study were not all
trained mental health professionals. While "a few" had advanced
degrees in psychology, and "some" were social workers or were
trained in "something like 'rehab counseling,'" others had no appar-
ent specialized mental health/behavioral training.' 0' Similarly, street
police officers-in many cases, the true "institutional gatekeepers"-
employ purportedly "common sensical" concepts of mental illness
(manifested as the display of "disrespect, recalcitrance and moral
98. Susan C. Reed & Dan A. Lewis, The Negotiation of Voluntary Admission in Chicago's
State Mental Hospitals, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 137, 139 (1990); see also Michael J. Churgin,
An Essay on Commitment and the Emergency Room: Implications for the Delivery of Mental
Health Services, 13 LAW. MED. & HEALTH CARE 297, 301 (1985) (emergency certification
process not used in cases where "the individual [was] a very 'interesting' patient").
99. See Rosenfeld, Sex Roles, supra note 80.
100. For a parallel example of how "worth" is measured in other populations, see Baron,
supra note 86, at 350 (patient's intelligence, personality and socioeconomic status all taken into
account in determining degree of care given to patient on arrival in emergency room where
death is a possibility); Laura Ryan, Note, Washington State Prison Procedure for the Forcible
Administration of Antipsychotic Medication to Prison Inmates Does Not Violate Due Process, 59
U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1407-08 n. 225 (1991) (suggesting that Professor Baron's findings also
apply to situations involving the delegation of medical decisionmaking power to prison
officials, thus creating the possibility that similar illegitimate criteria will be employed;
discussing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), limiting right of convicted prisoners to
refuse antipsychotic medication, and vested broad discretion in prison officials in medication
decisionmaking); see also Ira Sommers & Deborah R. Baskin, The Prescription of Psychiatric
Medications in Prison: Psychiatric Versus Labeling Perspectives, 7 JUST. Q. 739 (1990)
(decision to medicate mildly impaired prisoners influenced by social factors, including sex and
age).
101. Reed & Lewis, supra note 98, at 142. On the impact that other "gatekeepers," that is,
state hospital admissions officers, have on commitment rates, see Pierce et al., supra note 90, at
52 (noting that the impact of publicity surrounding the "vivid" case significantly affected
behavior of county admissions personnel, leading to disproportionately higher civil
commitment rates in that county but not in other like counties). On the "vividness" heuristic,
see infra part III.C.
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defect") and reshape their police reports to "magnify the subjective
madness [sic] and dangerousness of their subjects" so as to insure
their admission into forensic hospitals.' °2
Line treatment staff often view hospitalized patients who attempt
to assert their constitutional and statutory rights as "troublemakers,"
and thus privilege quietly compliant patients and subordinate "diffi-
cult" patients (who are considered less "worth it")." 3 This becomes
even more important (and troubling) when considering the power that
hospital staff frequently has over patients' access to their counsel. If
an institutionalized patient wants to contact counsel, she frequently
must ask ward "line staff" personnel to place the necessary telephone
call. If, for whatever reason, the staff member determines that this is
"inappropriate"-for example, if the patient is labeled a "trouble-
maker"l'-the promise of counsel becomes little more than a hoax.
This alleged, presumptuous and oppressive "morality" of non-
professional gatekeepers thus contributes to, and, in some cases, con-
trols involuntary civil commitment decisionmaking.' 015 Expert
102. Perlin, Morality, supra note 3, at 140 (quoting Robert A. Menzies, Psychiatrists in
Blue: Police Apprehension of Mental Disorder and Dangerousness, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 429, 446
(1987)); see also BURSTEN, supra note 77, at 95 (arresting officer has far more impact on
whether mentally disabled criminal suspect is treated as "mad" or "bad" than does the entire
insanity defense system); John Petrila, The Insanity Defense and Other Mental Health
Dispositions in Missouri, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 81, 91 n.36 (1982) (reporting on attitudes
of forensic staff toward patients, and staff's use of OCS to deny presence of mental disability in
patients); cf. Thomas L. Kuhlman, Unavoidable Tragedies in Madison, Wisconsin: A Third
View, 43 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 72, 73 (1992) (police officers "have seen many of
their efforts at emergency detention circumvented by mental health professionals or
commitment courts") (emphasis added).
103. See SUSAN SHEEHAN, Is THERE No PLACE ON EARTH FOR ME (1982). Other
examples are more malignant. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 268 (3d Cir. 1983)
(attendants beat a psychotic patient while he was restrained to his bed after patient filed right
to refuse treatment lawsuit).
104. Interview with Professor Keri Gould, former senior attorney for the Mental Hygiene
Legal Service, New York City (March 3, 1992). Staff has similar power over voluntary
patients seeking to exercise their right to leave the hospital, something that may not be done in
many jurisdictions unless a 72 hour notice is given to the hospital (to give it the option of
converting the patient to voluntary status). See 1 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5,
§ 3.69, at 407.
105. This does not mean that the testimonial process should exclude non-professionals. See
Bagby, Community Values, supra note 90, at 169-72 (recommending that hospitals use
"indigenous paraprofessionals" in the commitment process to insure proper emphasis on
"cultural-contextual values" and "attenuate potential misuse of hospitals as agents of social
control"). In many instances, non-professionally trained hospital staff "line" workers will
have the most day-to-day knowledge of a patient's behavior and can offer true insights into the
questions typically before courts. Compare In re Miller, 362 N.Y.S.2d 628, 633 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1974) (suggesting that at "not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI) release hearing,
witnesses should include "hospital employees such as nurses, orderlies, housekeepers and other
who have had daily or frequent contact with petitioner") with People v. Bolden, 266 Cal. Rptr.
724, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (conflicting testimony between medical doctor and 'psychologist,
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attempts at making self-referentially "moral" decisions as to "worth"
(so as to ensure access to treatment)"° and either exaggerating 7 or
downplaying 08 certain behavioral characteristics either to insure or
deprive patients of treatment further accentuates the pretextual
nature of the commitment system. This also forces the concession
that the doctrinal differences in substantive commitment standards
that frequently are the focus of appellate "test case" litigation as well
as scholarly articles--e.g., Is an overt act a necessary predicate for a
dangerousness finding? Can one be "gravely disabled" without being
dangerous to oneself under a parens patriae standard?-appear even
less academically significant in this context. 1" 9
Dr. H. Richard Lamb's attack on courts for interpreting involun-
tary civil commitment laws too "literally"' 10 suggests further that
there is nothing transparent or sub rosa about the entire "morality"
attack on the legal process. It is a blatant attempt to aggregate power,
to subvert the law, and to privilege "expertise" over all competing
social values. In short, it suggests that the entire involuntary civil
commitment process may be pretextual."'1 It also suggests that the
courts' pre-reflective OCS on this question-that it can be "safely
assume[d]" that hospitals and their medical professionals are "disin-
terested decisionmakers" who certainly "have no bias against the
patient or against release"II2 -is no more accurate than the United
States Supreme Court's OCS in United States v. Leon that there is "no
who stated NGRI acquittee would stop taking medication in outpatient program and then
become violent, and recreational therapist and nursing assistant, who stated that acquittee
understood value of medication and would continue to take medication in outpatient setting).
106. See Reed & Lewis, supra note 98, at 146.
107. See Menzies, supra note 102.
108. See Petrila, supra note 102.
109. See, e.g., Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12; Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66
(questioning whether difference in various substantive insanity defense standards makes a "real
world" difference in the way the public views the insanity defense or in the way courts treat
insanity pleaders).
110. H. Richard Lamb, Involuntary Treatment for the Homeless Mentally Ill, 4 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 269, 277 (1989).
111. Contrast Dr. Lamb's acceptance of pretextual testimony with other scholarly inquiries
focusing on the ways that other false testimony may taint the legal process. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL AVERY & DAVID RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUCT, LAW AND LITIGATION 8-5
(2d ed. 1987); J. Martin Kaplan, Children Don't Always Tell the Truth, 35 J. FORENSIC SCI.
661 (1990).
112. Stitt v. State Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 562 So. 2d 259, 262 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1990) (quoting Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434, 1438 (11th Cir. 1984)).
Another field of inquiry involves economically-oriented "bias" in the way that the
commitment process may be abused by for-profit hospitals. See, e.g., Perlin, Power, supra note
74, at 119 (increase in for-profit psychiatric hospitals increases the number of children
admitted at a time when some "[p]hysicians are pressured ... to maintain a maximal census
and thus increase profits" (discussing results reported in Richard Dalton & Marc A. Foreman,
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evidence" to suggest that judges ignore or subvert the Fourth Amend-
ment or to suggest that they have any stake in the outcomes of crimi-
nal prosecutions. a
13
This all assumes yet another fact-not-in-evidence: that judges
actually interpret involuntary civil commitment laws "strictly," by
imposing by-the-book burdens on hospital and state lawyers, by zeal-
ously protecting patients' procedural rights, and by regularly dis-
missing, on so-called "legal technicalities," "worthy" involuntary
civil commitment petitions. 114 This, of course, happens rarely (if
ever). Cases are frequently decided in an expedited manner,I1 5 coun-
sel for patients are usually passive, 1 6 and, in some states, trial court
commitment decisions are virtually never appealed. 17 More recent
evidence demonstrates further that, as length of proposed hospitaliza-
tion increases, hearings become shorter in length and less
adversarial. 118
In addition, judges' attitudes closely mimic those of Dr.
Chodoff's "moral expert." Michael Saks quotes from a Massachu-
setts trial judge, speaking to mental health law students and their
professors who had observed a commitment docket: "I guess you
noticed that some of these people were not fit subjects for commit-
ment under the statute. But, after all, I am a human being. I care
about what is best for these people, and I have to do what I think is
right." 9 As Saks concludes, "this judge in effect abolished the state's
commitment laws, substituted his own, and produced the result he
wanted notwithstanding the democratic and legal processes that
existed to control these decisions."'
120
Conflicts of Interest Associated With the Psychiatric Hospitalization of Children, 57 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 12, 13 (1987))).
113. 468 U.S. 897, 916-17 (1984).
114. See Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 15, at 44 n.33 ("Experienced lawyers confirm
that attempts at vigorous cross-examination and at the development of novel defenses are
frequently rebuffed-angrily-by trial judges assigned to civil commitment dockets").
115. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 n.17 (1979) (statistical studies reveal that
average commitment hearing lasted from 3.8 to 9.2 minutes); Leslie Scallet, The Realities of
Mental Health Advocacy: State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, in MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY:
AN EMERGING FORCE IN CONSUMERS' RIGHTS 79, 81 (L. Kopolow & H. Bloom eds., 1977)
(former system of representation in place in Milwaukee County operated as a "greased runway
to the county mental health center").
116. Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 15, at 43.
117. Id. at 50 (in Virginia, from 1976 to 1986, only two reported appellate civil cases dealt
with questions of mental hospitalization).
118. Charles D. Parry & Eric Turkheimer, Length of Hospitalization and Outcome of
Commitment and Recommitment Hearings, 43 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 65 (1992).
119. Saks, supra note 83, at 293.
120. Id.; see also Ensminger & Liguori, supra note 96, at 252 ("The judge may tell the
patient that he is [being committed] because it is the 'benevolent thing to do,' when he will
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It is important to consider how closely this sort of "morality"
comports with the "moral" message sent by Dr. Lamb, Dr. Chodoff
and others to their psychiatric colleagues. Such expert witnesses
could not freely testify in ways that subvert statutes and case law if
the legal system did not tacitly approve. 2'
3. EXPERTISE AND INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
a. Introduction
While the incompetency to stand trial process generally lacks the
same kind of "smoking guns" that Drs. Chodoff and Lamb left in the
form of suggestions about testimony in the involuntary civil commit-
ment process, a closer examination reveals that considerations of
alleged "morality" frequently drive this system as well.
At the outset, the criminal process is recognizable as a "morality
play,"' 122 a "pageant which dramatizes the differences between 'we'
and 'they' by portraying a symbolic encounter between the two'
1 23
that allows us to "keep peace with the public morality."' 124 The crimi-
nal process symbolizes the existence and enforcement of social norms,
and manipulates criminal defendants as part of society's struggle for
just punishment. 125  Because the incompetency plea frequently is
incorrectly viewed as a means to "undercut the [death] penalty,"'
126
and thus purportedly rob society of its right to retributive ven-
geance, 27 it is not surprising that "morality" questions infuse the
admit privately that he would not want the patient walking around in the neighborhood he
lives in.").
121. Cf. Uri Aviram, Care or Convenience? On the Medical-Bureaucratic Model of the
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 163 (1990) (discussing collusive
behavior between courts and doctors in Israel's commitment system).
122. Samuel J. Brakel, Presumption, Bias, and Incompetency in the Criminal Process, 1974
Wis. L. REV. 1105, 1116.
123. Stanley Ingber, A Dialectic: The Fulfillment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law,
28 RUTGERS L. REV. 861, 911 (1975).
124. Sidney J. Kaplan, Barriers to the Establishment of a Deterministic Criminal Law, 46
Ky. L.J. 103, 104 (1957). See generally Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66, at 628-29.
125. Ingber, supra note 123, at 911; Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66, at 622 n.104; Louis
M. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change
in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 501 (1980).
126. Ralph Slovenko, The Developing Law on Competency to Stand Trial, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 165, 178 (1977); cf H. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP? DEFENDANTS FOUND
INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL 8 (1979) (murder was the charge in only 15% of
incompetency petitions in New York state sample).
127. See Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66, at 628-29:
Punishment may . . . be viewed as a "ritualistic device" which conveys
"moral condemnation" upon wrongdoers, and which dramatizes such
condemnation through a public "degradation ceremony." . ..
Thus, punishment is clearly a socially sanctioned safety valve through which
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incompetency to stand trial process."
b. How Morality Affects Incompetency Findings
"Morality" issues affect the incompetency to stand trial process
in several critical ways. First, the process is subject to significant
political bias. Second, the power imbalance issues that taint the entire
forensic process are especially potent. Third, the fact that the inade-
quacy of pre-trial evaluations, cursory testimony, the misuse and mis-
application of substantive standards, and the non-implementation of
Supreme Court constitutional directives receive little judicial or schol-
arly attention suggests that specific social ends animate the entire
incompetency to stand trial system.
i. Political Bias: A defendant competent to stand trial must
have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and ... a rational as well
as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him."' 28
Functionally, this means that he must have the ability to
communicate, the capacity to reason "from a single premise to a
simple conclusion," the ability to "recall and relate facts concerning
his actions," and the "ability to comprehend instructions and advice,
and make decisions based on well-explained alternatives."' 29
Because of the ambiguities of the Supreme Court's test and the
difficulties experienced in applying these standards, 130 mental health
professionals have attempted to codify listings of evaluative criteria,
specifying areas of mental deficiency that would render a defendant
we express community condemnation of wrongdoers, especially the wrongdoers
we fear the most. In this way, punishment takes on an important symbolic
significance: more than mere disapproval, it represents "a kind of vindictive
resentment" as a "way of getting back at the criminal."
(citations omitted). See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
INSANITY DEFENSE (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at chapter II.B., on file with the author)
[hereinafter PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE].
For a recent important inquiry into the roots of these attitudes, see Harold G. Grasmick
et al., Protestant Fundamentalism and the Retributive Doctrine of Punishment, 30 CRIMINOL-
oGY 21 (1992).
128. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
129. 3 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 14.03, at 212 (quoting Peter R. Silten &
Richard Tullis, Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1053, 1062-64
(1977) and Allen P. Wilkinson & Arthur C. Roberts, Defendants' Competency to Stand Trial,
40 P.O.F.2d 171, 187 (1974)).
130. See, e.g., ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 78, at 13-15; Silten & Tullis, supra note 129,
at 1058-65. See generally Ronald Roesch & Stephen Golding, Legal and Judicial
Interpretation of Competency to Stand Trial Statutes and Procedures, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 420
(1978).
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incompetent to stand trial.131 Critics disagree with these approaches
on grounds of political bias' 32 and because they attempt to "quantify
the essentially unquantifiable."' 133 Thus, a defendant who completed
the open-ended sentence "Jack felt that the judge... ." with the words
"was unjust" or "was wrong" or "was too harsh" or "was his enemy"-
answers that a defendant with prior experience with the criminal
justice system certainly might select-scored zero points on the
Harvard Laboratory Instrument test, 3 4 one of the most important
tests in use. 1
35
Further, traditionally, judges rarely have based their ultimate
decisions on "anything but the concluding statement in the
psychiatric report to the court."' 3 6 The ultimate legal decision as to
competence often has thus fallen, perhaps by default, to the
examiner. 3  Given the way that bias can and does infect the forensic
evaluation, a3 important questions arise as to the legitimacy of the
entire process. This is especially problematic because examiners
frequently demand a higher level of competency than is required by
appellate case law.' 3 9  In short, any inquiry into the way that
defendants are found competent or incompetent to stand trial must
take into account the expert's own "moral" perspective on the
operation of the process.
131. Historically, Dr. Louis McGarry and Dr. Ames Robey developed some of the most
important instruments. See Ames Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist
for Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 616 (1965); LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, FINAL REPORT, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1973) [hereinafter HARVARD LABORATORY INSTRUMENT]. For
more recent efforts, see, e.g., 3 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 14.03, at 214-15
n.47 (listing other approaches).
132. See Brakel, supra note 122, at 1111-16.
133. Gerald Bennett, A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA Standards Relating to
Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 379 (1985); see also Ellis &
Luckasson, supra note 68, at 428 (mentally retarded defendants may simply mimic evaluator
so as to come up with "right" answers to quantified tests).
134. See generally HARVARD LABORATORY INSTRUMENT, supra note 131, at 75-88.
135. See also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Standard 7-4.1
commentary at 173 (1989) [hereinafter MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS] ("competency to
stand trial was equated with an understanding of and acceptance of an idealistic view of the
criminal justice system").
136. ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 78, at 17.
137. See A. Louis McGarry, Competency for Trial and Due Process Via the State Hospital,
122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 623, 626 (1965).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
139. McGarry, supra note 81; Michael L. Perlin, Overview of Rights in the Criminal Process,




ii. Power Imbalances: The significant power imbalances that
plague the entire forensic mental health system deserve further
reflection. When an employee of a public hospital or correctional
agency evaluates a patient to determine whether he is incompetent to
stand trial, the dilemma of "dual loyalties" or "double agentry" is
stark: whose interests does the examining witness truly represent?
14
This is especially problematic in the case of a "notorious" defendant,
whose transfer or release from maximum security confinement would
be sure to engender controversy and publicity. 141 It is necessary to
ask whether clinicians are unduly biased by their agency relationships
and whether objectivity is inevitably compromised in this set of
circumstances.' 42 It is clear that morality issues can specifically
invade the incompetency to stand trial process.
Thoughtful forensic mental health professionals are beginning to
look carefully at the underlying moral and ethical issues. 143 Yet, the
briefest scan of the United States Supreme Court's docket in this area
over the past decade reveals that, in many systems, none of these
concerns are even "on the table." The forensic mental health system
operates utterly independently of these ethical concerns.'" The well-
known testimony of Dr. James Grigson in capital cases speaks for
140. See Halleck, supra note 74, at 279; Perlin, Power, supra note 74, at 116; Jerome J.
Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemma of Dual Loyalties, 60 ABA J. 1521, 1521 (1984).
Cases involving defendants evaluated at public psychiatric hospitals raise additional
questions as to witnesses' neutrality or objectivity. Where the witness is also the patient's
treating doctor, he frequently has an additional stake in wanting the judge to believe that his
diagnosis and treatment plan are the right ones. Where the witness is called as an independent
court witness, he has a stake in maintaining the proper relationship with the court so as to
insure further appointments. Interview with Professor Keri Gould, supra note 104; see also
Wexler, supra note 96, at 23 (disposition of cases involving incompetent-to-stand-trial
defendants driven by financial considerations, not clinical needs).
141. Shestack, supra note 140, at 1522; see also supra note 77 (discussing NIMH report).
142. Richard Rogers, Ethical Dilemmas in Forensic Evaluations, 5 BEHAV. ScL. & L. 149,
150 (1987). In many jurisdictions, evaluating witnesses are employees of the facility to which
the subject of the incompetency proceeding would be transferred if he were deemed
incompetent to stand trial. It seems inevitable that agency relationships would taint the
evaluators' opinions in some of these cases.
143. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, The Parable of the Forensic Psychiatrist: Ethics and the
Problem of Doing Harm, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249 (1990); Stephen L. Golding,
Mental Health Professionals and the Courts: The Ethics of Expertise, 13 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 281 (1990); Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Is It Unethical to Offer
Predictions of Future Violence?, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621 (1993); Douglas Mossman, Is
Forensic Testimony Inevitably Unethical? (Jan. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). See generally Perlin, Power, supra note 74, at 120 n.74 (citing sources).
144. See, e.g., 3 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, §§ 16.03-.04A, 17.13-.14, at
413-35, 529-40; id. § 16.04A, at 123-24 (Supp. 1992) (discussing Powell v. Texas, 109 S. Ct.
3146 (1989), Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983); and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the
Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden
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itself. 145
From where does this tension between ethical forensic behavior
and the courts' regular sanctioning of testimony that reflects the
starkest power imbalances between putatively incompetent defendants
and the state stem? Perhaps from "the deeply rooted moral and
religious tension which surrounds the attribution of individual
responsibility for 'good' and 'evil.' 146 A finding of incompetency
may "rob" the public of the opportunity to take out its moralized
societal aggression on the defendant. The tension reminds us that the
relationship between "morality" and "power" factors into any
constructable ultimate equation.
iii. Social Ends:'4 7 Obsessive fears of malingering, incessant
confusion of substantive incompetent to stand trial ("IST") and "not
guilty by reason of insanity" ("NGRI") standards, and unquestioning
acceptance of patently inadequate testimony all contribute
significantly to a judicial perspective that subordinates the legitimacy
of the IST process and marginalizes potentially IST defendants. The
judiciary is not, however, totally to blame; all parties to the system
are culpable. Defense counsel use the incompetency process as a
"bargaining chip" in plea negotiations, as a source of information for
the eventual sentencing hearing, or as a "dry run" to determine
whether a non-responsibility defense is viable.' 41 Prosecutors use it as
a means of removing from society defendants against whom they
might have a weak case, or as a means of preventive detention. '49
Experts' misuse of the process frequently "plays into" the needs
of judges and counsel. Empirical studies show that mental health
professionals overpredict incompetence to stand trial, primarily
because of the erroneous belief that this status is synonymous with
psychosis. 5' Over twenty years ago, Professors Robert A. Burt and
Norval Morris set out the paradigmatic incompetency to stand trial
testimonial dialogue:
Rationales, or "Doctrinal Abyss'?, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Perlin, Symbolic
Values].
145. George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerousness," Psychiatric Testimony, and
Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977) (Grigson testified at "the brink of
quackery"); see also Charles P. Ewing, "Dr. Death" and the Case for an Ethical Ban on
Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8
AM. J.L. & MED. 407 (1983); Perlin, Crime & Culture, supra note 127, at 52 n.162.
146. Golding, supra note 143, at 287.
147. See infra part IV.B.2.
148. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 135, at 163.
149. Id. at 163-64.
150. Christopher Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith: The Constitutional Contours of the Forensic
Evaluation, 31 EMORY L.J. 71, 123 n.220 (1982).
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Judge: Doctor, is he incompetent?
Psychiatrist: Your Honor, he is psychotic!''
This is intuitively bad diagnosis, bad forensic testimony, and bad
law. Yet it continues regularly. First, and perhaps foremost, it meets
judicial needs. Judges are primarily concerned that incompetency
assessments conform to minimal legal requirements. Accordingly,
they are likely to require only that the evaluation "offer no less than
what the judge has become accustomed to in past assessments." This
attitude produces disincentive for new methods that might engender
uncertainty, the low card in any heuristic judge's hand. 52 Anecdotal
evidence suggests that many judges are entirely comfortable with this
state of affairs in other forensic assessment situations as well.1
53
Second, it appears that judges are nearly as disinterested in "the
truth" in considering competency as they are in "dropsy" cases.
Judges concede that they routinely grant motions for competency
evaluations even when they believe: (1) the motion is intended as a
trial delay tactic; (2) defense counsel misunderstands the competency
criteria; and (3) the motion is "unjustified and/or unsupported."'
54
This is problematic for many reasons. Hospital evaluation staff
reveal a bias against returning defendants to trial, incorrectly presum-
ing that a defendant remains incompetent until he demonstrates his
competency. I" This leads to unnecessarily lengthy commitments that
frequently exceed the maximum sentence for the crime charged and
often last a patient's lifetime.' 56 Next, degrees of competency to stand
151. Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Insanity Plea, 40
U. CHI. L. REV. 66, 92 n.109 (1972).
152. Thomas Grisso, The Economic and Scientific Future of Forensic Psychological
Assessment, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 831, 836 (1987) (attorneys' influence and attitudes similar
to those of judges).
153. See Michael L. Perlin, "Pretexts Within the Forensic System: Why Are We Really
Doing This This Way?", (paper presented at Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, Toronto, Ont.,
Canada, June 1990, on file with author) [hereinafter Perlin, Forensic System] (recounting story
told by judge to forensic psychologists at conference: "Look guys, all this other stuff is
interesting and all that, but it's not really very helpful to me. When you're on the stand I want
to know one thing: is the defendant insane or isn't he? Just tell me that and we can backfill the
details later."); see also Norman G. Poythress, Concerning Reform in Expert Testimony: An
Open Letter From a Practicing Psychologist, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 41 (1982) (describing
hostile judicial reaction when author-expert witness refused to testify as to ultimate question).
154. ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 78, at 192; Roesch & Golding, supra note 130.
155. McGarry, supra note 81, at 51. Jurisdictions are split on the question of the allocation
of the burden of proof at incompetency hearings. See 3 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra
note 5, § 14.05, at 222-25. The Supreme Court recently held that the allocation of the burden
of proof to the defendant who is asserting incompetency does not offend due process. Medina
v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2577-78 (1992).
156. Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 921,
938 (1985). Although the Supreme Court declared such indeterminate commitments
unconstitutional 21 years ago in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), as of 1979, that case
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trial, like other competencies, fall on a continuum and are almost
always in flux. 17 The all-or-nothing paradigm often demanded by
courts is dissonant with the clinical realities. Finally, clinical evalu-
ators rarely inquire into the skills that a specific defendant actually
needs to stand trial. 158 Useful questions-Will the case involve a trial
or a guilty plea? Will the defense be a denial or will it raise an affirm-
ative defense? Will it involve a Mapp or Miranda motion? Will the
defendant testify?-are rarely asked. If an evaluator does not know
the functions that a defendant will need to perform, then the evalua-
tion process becomes even more of a charade. t59
A flawed incompetency process purports to serve other social
ends as well. When Montana abolished its insanity defense, the ulti-
mate effect was simply that courts found more defendants incompe-
tent to stand trail who would have pled "not guilty by reason of
insanity" under the prior law, and then committed them to the same
maximum security forensic facilities to which they would have been
sent had they been acquitted by reason of insanity. 160 Again, use of
the incompetency process served a purportedly "moral" end. Mon-
tana legislators were able to assuage angry voters who viewed the
insanity defense as a means by which a defendant can improperly
"beat a rap." 161 The dispositional result was virtually the same as if
the defense had not been abolished.
4. CONCLUSION
In the types of cases discussed here, forensic witnesses frequently
exhibit what is known in substantive criminal law as "wilful blind-
was not implemented in nearly half the states. Winick, supra, at 940. I discuss the
implications of the fact that such rights are not self-executing in this context in Perlin, Fatal
Assumption, supra note 15, at 47-49; see also Wertlieb, supra note 80, at 336 (as of 1988,
Attorneys General of Hawaii and Virginia indicated that incompetent to stand trial mentally
retarded defendants will be institutionalized until found "fit to proceed" (citing James K.
McAfee & Michele Gural, Individuals With Mental Retardation and the Criminal Justice
System: The View From States' Attorneys General, 26 MENTAL RETARDATION 5, 9 (1988))).
157. Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Competency,
138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1465 (1981); Winick, supra note 156, at 966.
158. Winick, supra note 156, at 973-74.
159. See Gerald T. Bennett & Arthur F. Sullwood, Competence to Proceed: A Functional
and Context-Determinative Decision, 29 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1119, 1123 (1984); see also Stephen
L. Golding et al., Assessment and Conceptualization of Competency to Stand Trial, 8 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 321, 322-23 (1984).
160. Henry J. Steadman et al., Maintenance of an Insanity Defense Under Montana's
"Abolition" of the Insanity Defense, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 357 (1989). I discuss this in the
context of the ritualistic role of punishment in Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66, at 628-29
n.126.
161. See generally Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66.
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ness." I 2 Their suspicions as to what is really going on in the criminal
trial process may be aroused, but they "deliberately omito]... further
enquiries, because [they] wishf to remain in ignorance ....,,63 In all
these cases, courts elect not to concern themselves with the underly-
ing issues. The cases' dispositions serve the judicial system's instru-
mental purposes: the quick disposition of criminal cases, the
institutionalization of mentally disabled criminal defendants, and the
efficient use of the criminal courts. In addition, courts and experts
demonstrate the impact of cognitive dissonance-the tendency of
individuals to reinterpret information or experience that conflicts with
internally accepted or publicly articulated beliefs in order to avoid the
unpleasant state caused by such inconsistencies. '6 This reinterpreta-
tion is consciously rationalized through the use of cognitive heuristic




Another major contributor to pretextual decisionmaking is the
use of disingenuous heuristic devices by expert witnesses testifying in
involuntary civil commitment and incompetency to stand trial cases
and by courts in deciding such cases. Examination of case law devel-
opments in these two areas reveals the extent to which heuristic think-
ing permeates both the trial and the appellate processes. Although
there are a few important instances in which courts have rejected this
type of thinking and have approached such cases sensitively and
reflectively,' 65 doctrinal developments and individual decisions are
still informed largely by the cognitive distortions reflected in heuris-
tics use.
162. The classic policy debate is found in United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.
1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
163. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 57 (2d ed. 1961).
164. See generally JACK W. BREHM & ARTHUR R. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE (1962); LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); GuY
R. LEFRANCOIS, PSYCHOLOGY 518 (2d ed. 1983); Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith,
Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1959).
I discuss cognitive dissonance in a mental disability law context in Perlin, Morality, supra note
3, at 139; see also Winick, supra note 78, at 70-71; cf Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A
Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1203-04 (1989) (we deny the bases of legal
fictions because of "legal dissonance").
165. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (trial court opinions),
supplemented, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981),
vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987) (panel
opinion), on reh'g, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
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"Heuristics" is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to the
implicit thinking devices that individuals use to oversimplify complex,
information-processing tasks. The use of these heuristic devices often
leads to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions, and causes
decisionmakers to "ignore or misuse items of rationally useful infor-
mation." '166 The "vividness" heuristic teaches that one single, vivid,
memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data
upon which rational choices should be made.1 67 President Reagan's
famous "welfare queen" anecdote is a textbook example of heuristic
behavior. 161 It is important to understand that mental health profes-
sionals are just as susceptible to the use of these devices as are judges,
jurors, legislators, and lay persons. 169
Through the "availability" heuristic, we judge the probability or
frequency of an event based upon the ease with which we recall it.
Through the "typification" heuristic, we characterize a current expe-
rience by reference to past stereotypic behavior. Through the "attri-
bution" heuristic, we interpret a wide variety of additional
information to reinforce pre-existing stereotypes. Through the "myth
of particularistic proofs" heuristic, we erroneously assume that case-
specific (anecdotal) information is qualitatively different from base-
rate (statistical) information. Through the "hindsight bias" heuristic,
we exaggerate how easily we could have predicted an event before-
hand. Through the "outcome bias" heuristic, we base our evaluation
166. Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12, at 14-15; see also id. at 12-14, 15-17; Perlin,
Questions, supra note 14, at 966 n.46 (quoting John S. Carroll & John W. Payne, The
Psychology of the Parole Decision Process: A Joint Application of Attribution Theory and
Information-Processing Psychology, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 13, 21 (John S.
Carroll & John W. Payne eds., 1976)).
167. See David L. Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial Policy, 19 STAN. LAW.
10, 13 (1984).
168. I consider Reagan's heuristic style in Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12, at 16, 20.
169. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. WEBSTER ET AL., CLINICAL ASSESSMENTS BEFORE TRIAL
121 (1982); Bagby, Community Values, supra note 90, at 172; Margaret A. Jackson, The
Clinical Assessment and Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Scientific Analysis, 16 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 114 (1989); Margaret Windsor Jackson, Psychiatric Decision-Making for the
Courts: Judges, Psychiatrists, Lay People?, 9 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 507 (1986). On juror
use of heuristic reasoning, see Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts:
Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 247, 264-65 (1990); Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12, at 39-53;
Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in
Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1050 (1991); see also Caton F. Roberts &
Stephen L. Golding, The Social Construction of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity, 15 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 349, 372 (1991) (jurors' pre-existing attitudes toward insanity defense
strongest predictor of individual verdicts). On legislative use of heuristic reasoning, see Perlin,
Morality, supra note 3, at 138-39; Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and




of a decision on our evaluation of an outcome. 7 °
2. HEURISTICS AND INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
Research confirms that heuristic thinking dominates the mental
disability law process. 7' Empirical studies demonstrate how the viv-
idness effect distorts perceptions of civil commitment candidates, the
relationship between civil commitment and the criminal process, and
civil commitment outcomes.1 72 In these instances, "[t]he drama of a
170. See generally Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12, at 13-18, 29-30 (citing JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
[hereinafter JUDGMENT]); see also SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL
REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981); RICHARD NISBETr & LEE
Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980);
REASONING, INFERENCE, AND JUDGMENT IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY (Dennis C. Turk &
Peter Salovey eds., 1988) (discussing heuristics in general); Hal R. Arkes, Principles in
Judgment/Decision Making Research Pertinent to Legal Proceedings, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 429
(1989) (hindsight and outcome biases); Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in
Decision Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569 (1988); Donald N. Bersoff,
Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of
Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 329 (1992) (discussing
heuristics); Neal V. Dawson et al., Hindsight Bias: An Impediment to Accurate Probability
Estimation in Clinicopathologic Conferences, 8 MED. DECISION MAKING 259 (1988); Shari S.
Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency in Sentencing, 7 BEHAVIORAL
SCI. & L. 73 (1989) (vividness effect); Anthony N. Doob & Julian N. Roberts, Social
Psychology, Social Attitudes and Attitudes Toward Sentencing, 16 CAN. J. BEHAVIORAL SCI.
269 (1984) (vividness effect); Baruch Fischhoff, HindsightForesight: The Effect of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, I J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975) (hindsight and outcome biases); Harold H. Kelley,
The Process of Causal Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1973) (attribution); Dan
Russell, The Causal Dimension Scale: A Measure of How Individuals Perceive Causes, 42 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1137 (1982) (attribution); Saks & Kidd, supra note 12, at 137
(availability); id. at 151 (particularistic proofs); David E. Van Zandt, Commonsense Reasoning,
Social Change, and the Law, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 894 (1987) (typification). In mental health
contexts, see, e.g., Harold Bursztajn et al., "Magical Thinking," Suicide, and Malpractice
Litigation, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 369 (1988); David B. Wexler & Robert F.
Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health Malpractice
Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 485 (1989). In the
criminal law context, see, e.g., R.D. Mackay & Andrew M. Colman, Excluding Expert
Evidence: A Tale of Ordinary Folk and Common Experience, 1991 CRIM. L. REV. 800 (1991).
171. In a series of papers, I have considered the power of heuristics on different aspects of
the mental health disability law system. See Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12 (insanity
defense); Perlin, Homelessness, supra note 169 (relationship between homelessness and
deinstitutionalization); Perlin, Questions, supra note 14 (right to refuse treatment); Perlin, Tea
Leaves, supra note 6 (same); Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous
Patient: New Directions for the 1990's, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29 (1992) [hereinafter
Perlin, Tarasoff] (application of Tarasoff doctrine); see also Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra
note 15, at 57-58 (on mental disability counsel's need to familiarize herself with heuristics
database); Perlin, Sanism, supra note 13, at 47 (on the way that heuristic thinking leads to
sanist behavior); Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 13, at 63 n. 114 (on the relationship between
heuristic thinking and courts' attitudes toward social science data in mental disability cases).
172. See Hiday & Smith, supra note 91, at 449 (aberrant behavior by a small number of
patients in sample distorted outcome perceptions; mental health professionals significantly
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few cases caused their retelling while the mundane cases faded from
memory." 17 3 Publicly salient events have dramatic impacts on invol-
untary civil commitment rates, especially where (1) the vivid event is
a homicide of a stranger, (2) the actor has prior contact with the
mental health system, and (3) the mental health system either dis-
charges the patient as "cured" or declines to admit him. Further-
more, such a single instance's empirical effect is independent of any
legislative change that might follow such an event. 174
Experts often use the typification heuristic in cases that involve
the improper prescription of medication. 175 Here, the treating doctor
"'slots' his patient into certain categories and prescribes a similar reg-
imen for all."'176 Also, clinicians significantly overestimate their diag-
nostic and predictive accuracy, and ignore supplemental means of
interpretation that might enhance their accuracy. 177 Through use of
the attribution heuristic, this data is ignored in the mental disability
law process.' 78  The fact that some expert witnesses, referred to as
"imperial experts" by Professor Michael Saks, "display a willingness
... to disregard what knowledge has been developed by the field from
which they claim to derive their expertise, and to substitute for that
overstate percentage of involuntary civil commitment cases that begin as police referrals and
that jeopardized staff safety); see also Henry J. Steadman et al., Psychiatric Evaluations of
Police Referrals in a General Hospital Emergency Room, 8 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 39
(1986).
173. Hiday & Smith, supra note 91, at 449.
174. Bagby & Atkinson, supra note 90, at 46. See generally William H. Fisher et al., supra
note 90, at 712. For an explanation of how one salient case can lead to the restructuring of an
entire body of jurisprudence, see James R. P. Ogloff, The Juvenile Death Penalty: A Frustrated
Society's Attempt for Control, 5 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 447 (1987) (discussing the scenario
preceding Vermont's elimination of a minimum age for prosecuting children as adults in
murder cases); see also People v. Seefeld, 290 N.W.2d 123, 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(discussing the impetus for adopting the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict).
175. See Hale v. Portsmouth Receiving Hosp., 338 N.E.2d 371 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1975) (doctor
failed to change prescription following his observation of side-effects and self-destructive
behavior by patient); Rosenfeld v. Coleman, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 635 (C.P. Northampton County
1959) (doctor prescribed addictive drugs to help patient see nature of his addictive
personality); Perlin, Power, supra note 74, at 125 (discussing Watkins v. United States, 589
F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1979) (doctors prescribed 50-day supply of Valium without taking medical
history or checking patient's medical records)).
176. Perlin, Power, supra note 74, at 125 n. 112 (citing sources discussing "slotting"
practices); see also, e.g., People v. Feagley, 535 P.2d 373, 397 n.31 (Cal. 1975) (state hospital
report on treatability of convicted sex offender was "mimeographed" and "very minimum-
grade form letter").
177. David Faust, Data Integration in Legal Evaluations: Can Clinicians Deliver on Their
Premises?, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 469, 480 (1989) (discussing results found in Robyn M.
Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668 (1989)); Baruch
Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT, supra note 170, at 422, 442; Sarah Lichtenstein et al.,
Calibration of Probabilities: The State of the Art, in JUDGMENT, supra note 170, at 306.
178. See Arkes, supra note 170, at 430-31.
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their own guesses," is also ignored.179
3. HEURISTICS AND INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
Little is known about the role of expertise in assessing the
treatability of mentally disabled criminal defendants, 8 ° and about the
accuracy of instruments that evaluate incompetency to stand trial.""'
Yet these are seemingly necessary predicates of incompetency to stand
trial commitments.
Research reveals that, in determining the likely future danger-
ousness of defendants found incompetent to stand trial, and thus in
need of institutionalization, 82 "expert" evaluations frequently rely
not on the examiners' experience or knowledge but on the facts of the
act upon which the defendant was originally indicted. In a study of
over 250 such individuals, the only variable that distinguished those
determined to be dangerous from those determined not to be danger-
ous was the alleged crime: "The more serious the alleged crime, the
more likely that the psychiatrist would find the defendant danger-
ous."1 8 3 Furthermore, there was a discrepancy between the criteria
actually employed by the examiners, such as seriousness of the crime,
and the criteria that the examiners reported as informing their deci-
179. Saks, supra note 83, at 294; see also James Wyda & Bert Black, Psychiatric Predictions
and the Death Penalty: An Unconstitutional Sword For the Prosecution But a Constitutional
Shield for the Defense, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 505, 513 (1989) (clinicians overvalue evidence
that supports their conclusions and deny counterevidence).
180. Richard Rogers & Christopher D. Webster, Assessing Treatability in Mentally
Disordered Offenders, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19 (1989).
181. Bersoff, supra note 170, at 354-55. On the development of a new computerized
assessment instrument, see George W. Barnard et al., Competency to Stand Trial: Description
and Initial Evaluation of a New Computer-Assisted Tool (CADCOMP), 19 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 367 (1991).
182. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Additional problems are raised in
jurisdictions where post-incompetency finding commitments are governed by statutes that do
not require a predicate dangerousness finding. See 3 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note
5, § 14.16B, at 108-09 n.265.45 (Supp. 1992) and Michael L. Perlin & Joel A. Dvoskin, AIDS-
Related Dementia and Competency to Stand Trial: A Potential Abuse of the Forensic Mental
Health System?, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 349 (1990) for discussion of N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 730.10-.70 (McKinney 1988).
183. Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1096 (1976); see
also Vernon L. Quinsey & Rudolf Ambtman, Variables Affecting Psychiatrists' and Teachers'
Assessments of the Dangerousness of Mentally Ill Offenders, 47 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 353 (1979).
More recent studies reveal differences in the variables relied upon by psychiatrists and
psychologists in reaching their decisions in insanity cases. Psychiatrists rely more heavily on
the defendant's version of the criminal incident and on the jail interview, while psychologists
are more likely to consider collaborative information such as jail observations and statements
by others. Beckham et al., supra note 82, at 86.
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sions, such as presence of impaired or delusional thinking."8 4
In reviewing these studies, Michael Bagby concludes that the dis-
crepancy between the criteria used and those reported as being used
suggests that intuitive or implicit beliefs, rather than expert knowl-
edge, often guide examiners' decisions.8 " We ignore Bagby's conclu-
sions, however, and continue to assume that treatment of
incompetency to stand trial somehow "works" and that experts have
some special expertise in assessing trial competency.8 6
4. HEURISTICS AND THE COURTS
Courts also regularly fall prey to heuristic behavior in mental
disability law cases.' 87 Bouchillon v. Collins, 88 a recent, extraordina-
rily sensitive decision by the Fifth Circuit, shows how both trial
judges and counsel may succumb to heuristic reasoning. The two
decisions in United States v. Charters,'89 a case that severely limited
the rights of federal incompetent-to-stand-trial detainees to refuse
antipsychotic medication, reflect how heuristics dominate the legal
thinking of some appellate judges, but not others.
a. Bouchillon v. Collins
In Bouchillon v. Collins, 9° the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district
court decision granting the defendant's writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that he had been incompetent to plead guilty to a robbery
charge.' 9' Prior to the entry of the defendant's guilty plea, there was
no hearing on his competence to stand trial and the defendant was not
evaluated by a mental health professional. The state trial judge had
relied primarily on the defendant's "demeanor at trial" in deciding to
accept his plea.' 92
184. Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 183, at 1096.
185. Bagby, Community Values, supra note 90, at 170-71; R. Michael Bagby, The
Deprofessionalization of Civil Commitment, 29 CAN. PSYCHOL. 234, 234 (1988).
186. Again, this must be read in light of data suggesting that clinical evaluators are often
confused about the applicable legal standard and frequently misunderstand the legal issue of
incompetency to stand trial, confusing it with the presence of a psychotic state. See Winick,
supra note 78, at 125 n. 180 (sources cited). See generally Winick, supra note 156.
187. See generally Bersoff, supra note 170. I discuss courts' use of heuristics in insanity
defense decisionmaking in Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12.
188. 907 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1990).
189. 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
190. 907 F.2d at 589.
191. The defendant was a Vietnam veteran who had been "repeatedly diagnosed" as
suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). He also was an abused child who
escaped from an orphanage at age twelve and was taken in by a prostitute who sexually abused
him. Id. at 590.
192. Id. at 591.
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The federal district court granted the defendant's writ applica-
tion on the ground that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
the question of his incompetency to stand trial and to proffer an
insanity defense.'93 This occurred despite counsel's awareness that
his client had "mental problems," had been institutionalized, and was
taking antipsychotic medication.' 94 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
found the defendant's mental condition to be "undisputed"' 95 and
considered whether his illness caused him to be incompetent to stand
trial. The court noted that the episodes of" 'numbing' and blackouts
during which he cannot be expected to exercise judgment or reason"
would not necessarily be obvious to laymen. 96 The court stressed
that demeanor is not dispositive. "[T]he existence of even a severe
psychiatric defect is not always apparent to laymen."'' 97 A defendant
"need not be catatonic, raving or frothing" to be legally
incompetent. 198
Interestingly, the defendant's trial counsel conceded that
although his client told him his entire medical history, he nonetheless
dissuaded Bouchillon from pleading insanity becauses of his own
prior unsuccessful experience with another insanity defense case in
the same judicial district. 199 The counsel admitted that he never
requested his client's medical records nor talked to witnesses about
his client's mental problems because the client "appeared rational." 2"
Both the trial judge and the defense counsel in Bouchillon dis-
played heuristic behavior. Taking refuge in "ordinary common
sense," they rejected the possibility that the defendant was mentally
ill because he did not "look" mentally ill.20 ' Their acceptance of lay
perceptions of demeanor evidence reflects the pernicious effect of the
typification heuristic. Since Bouchillon did not resemble their percep-
tion of the "typical" mentally ill criminal defendant, they rejected the
possibility that his mental illness might have made him incompetent
193. Id.
194. Id. at 595-96.
195. Id. at 592.
196. Id. at 593.
197. Id. at 593-94 (quoting Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1059 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977)).
198. Id. at 594 (quoting Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir. 1980)).
199. [H~e advised Bouchillon that "it was difficult to prove an insanity defense in
Lubbock, Texas." To drive this point home he told Bouchillon about one of his
recent cases in which ten members of the jury had voted for a guilty verdict
despite the testimony of numerous experts, including the well-known Dr.
Grigson, that his client was insane.
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to stand trial. In light of the lawyer's past losing effort with the
insanity defense, he "slotted" the case as one in which such a defense
should not be offered.20 2
b. United States v. Charters
In United States v. Charters, the Fourth Circuit, en banc, sharply
curtailed the rights of incompetent-to-stand-trial federal detainees to
refuse antipsychotic medication. 203 Applying the "professional judg-
ment" standard of Youngberg v. Romeo,204 the court limited its
inquiry to whether the drugging decision was made "by an appropri-
ate professional" and allowed for "only one question" to be asked of
experts in actions proceeding from medication decisions: "was this
decision reached by a process so completely out of professional
bounds as to make it explicable only as an arbitrary, nonprofessional
one?"2"5
The en banc court vacated an earlier panel decision in the same
case which had provided detainees with significantly greater proce-
dural and substantive due process protections. The panel had pre-
mised its conclusion on arguments grounded in the right to privacy,
the right to freedom of thought process, and the right to freedom
from unwanted physical intrusion.20 6 In rejecting the panel's reason-
ing, the court "revealed [its] apprehensiveness about dealing with
underlying social, psychodynamic, and political issues that form the
overt and hidden agendas in any right-to-refuse case. "207
The en banc opinion incorporated many heuristic devices in its
reading of trial testimony: availability, typification, the myth of par-
202. On the significance of visual imagery of the mentally disabled in shaping this area of
jurisprudence, see Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66, at 724-27, and sources cited, id. at 724-27
nn.591-608; see also, e.g., Rogers v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind. 1987) (affirming
rejection of insanity plea partly because of testimony that defendant, who at first acted
"nervous" with a "weird" expression, eventually appeared "calmer" and did not act "crazy");
State v. Clayton, 656 S.W.2d 344, 350 (Tenn. 1983) (conviction based on police testimony that
when defendant was arrested, he "was sitting with his head down" and "looked okay,"
reversed where defense presented "overwhelming, even staggering, evidence" of defendant's
paranoid schizophrenia); cf Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1555 (10th Cir. 1991) (mentally
disabled defendant "may outwardly act logically and consistently but nonetheless be unable to
make decisions on the basis of a realistic evaluation of his own best interests"), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1942 (1992).
203. 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990). See
generally Perlin, Questions, supra note 14.
204. 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).
205. Charters, 863 F.2d at 313.
206. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 490 (4th Cir. 1987), on reh'g, 863 F.2d 302
(4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
207. Perlin, Questions, supra note 14, at 966.
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ticularistic proofs, and the vividness effect.2 °S Its attempts to "sim-
plify one of the most complex problems facing decisionmakers,
assessing mentally disabled individuals' capacity to retain some
autonomous decisionmaking power, further reflects the pernicious
effect of the heuristic of attribution theory.
' 2 9
Taken together, Bouchillon and Charters demonstrate the differ-
ent ways judges can employ heuristics in deciding cases involving
incompetent criminal defendants. These same heuristics often lead
courts to trivialize, ignore, or otherwise misuse social science data in
the trial of mental disability cases.
5. HEURISTICS AND THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Through the use of heuristics, social science data is debunked
210
and the outrageous, memorable case dominates the judicial process.211
208. Id. at 986-87 (discussing the Charters court's reading of expert testimony that
questioned whether "any factual inquiry" into a schizophrenic patient's competency might
ever be valid).
209. Id. at 987.
210. See generally Perlin, Morality, supra note 3, at 136-37; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note
13. Courts are often suspicious of social science data, see J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah
Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66
N.C. L. REV. 741, 742-46 (1988), and are hostile to and threatened by its use. See, e.g., Ballew
v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (challenging the "wisdom-as
well as the necessity-of Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on numerology derived from
statistical studies" in a jury size case); see also Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of
Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1889 (1988); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the
Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 125 n.84 (1988) (quoting
DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 284 (1977)). Courts apply social
science data poorly, see Gary B. Melton, Bringing Psychology to the Legal System:
Opportunities, Obstacles, and Efficacy, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 488 (1987); David L. Suggs, The
Use of Psychological Research by the Judiciary: Do the Courts Adequately Assess the Validity of
the Research?, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 135 (1979), and are both teleological and inconsistent
in its use. See also Paul S. Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 335, 341 (1988); Norbert L. Kerr, Social Science and the
U.S. Supreme Court, in THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 56,
71 (Martin F. Kaplan ed., 1986).
Law professors are not necessarily any better. A visiting professor presented a paper
about pornography and the first amendment at a recent faculty development seminar. I asked
him if he was familiar with recent empirical studies raising some important questions about his
basic thesis, for example, Joseph E. Scott, What Is Obscene? Social Science and the
Contemporary Community Standard Test of Obscenity, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 29
(1991); Berl Kutchinsky, Pornography and Rape: Theory and Practice?, 14 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 47 (1991); Judith Becker & Robert M. Stein, Is Sexual Erotica Associated with
Sexual Deviance in Adolescent Males?, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 85 (1991). He responded,
"Well, I don't tend to think very much of empirical arguments." Most of those present
grinned and nodded. No one challenged or commented on his answer.
211. The paradigmatic example is John Hinckley's use of the insanity defense after shooting
President Reagan. See PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 127, (manuscript at VI.B.-C.,
on file with author); Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12; Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66;
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Although respected scholars have cogently demonstrated that the
judicial system has failed to develop methods to ensure the validity of
the research upon which expert testimony is based,212 most courts
remain profoundly disinterested.213 Paul Appelbaum's analysis of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Barefoot v. Estelle214 and McCleskey v.
Kemp 215 persuasively demonstrates that the Court's use of heuristic
devices leads it to misinterpret some significant empirical data, to dis-
parage other data, and to ignore yet other data.216 This occurs
because the consideration of such data would have forced the Justices
to take seriously arguments that ran counter to their own views.
Through the employment of heuristics, for instance, the en banc
Charters court:
abdicated its responsibilities to read, harmonize, distinguish, and
analyze social science data on the issues before it. It not only inad-
equately addressed the issue of side effects, but it also failed to ade-
quately address issues concerning competency determinations, the
therapeutic value of decision making, the empirical results of an
see also Richard Rogers, APA 's Position on the Insanity Defense: Empiricism Versus
Emotionalism, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 840 (1987).
212. See, e.g., Monahan & Walker, supra note 25; John Monahan & Laurens Walker,
Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571 (1991); John Monahan
& Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in
Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts:
Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1988); Laurens Walker &
John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559
(1987); see also Suggs, supra note 210. For a thoughtful judicial inquiry, see Abner J. Mikva,
Bringing the Behavioral Sciences to the Law: Tell it to the Judge or Talk to Your Legislator?, 8
BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 285 (1990).
213. See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Unpleasant Facts: The Supreme Court's Response to
Empirical Research on Capital Punishment, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 177 (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds.,
1988).
214. 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (testimony as to future dangerousness admissible at penalty phase
in death penalty case).
215. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting statistical evidence offered to show racial discrimination
in death penalty prosecutions).
216. Appelbaum, supra note 210; see also, e.g., Norman J. Finkel, Socioscientific Evidence
and Supreme Court Numerology 34 (Aug. 17, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author) (arguing that Justice Scalia's jurisprudence "knocks the social scientist off the Eighth
Amendment playing field").
Such judicial behavior suggests that psychological reactance theory is similarly applicable
to Supreme Court decisionmaking. See Bagby & Atkinson, supra note 90, at 58; Perlin,
Morality, supra note 3, at 138; Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66, at 610-11 n.48, 665 n.291;
David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity Acquittee Conditional
Release Process, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 18 (1991). See generally BREHM & BREHM, supra note
170, at 30-31 ("Given that a person believes he or she has a specific freedom, any force on the
individual that makes it more difficult for him or her to exercise the freedom constitutes a
threat to it. Thus, any kind of attempted social influence ... that work[s] against exercising
the freedom can be defined as threats.").
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announcement of a right to refuse treatment, and the courts' role in
such processes.2 17
This trivialization of social science serves additional instrumental
ends. It allows courts to more comfortably seek refuge in expressing
common sense "morality," to employ heuristic devices in a wide vari-
ety of cases in "uncomfortable" areas of the law, and, as the next Part




"Sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and char-
acter of other irrational prejudices that cause, and are reflected in pre-
vailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic
bigotry.2 19 It infects our jurisprudence and lawyering practices.22 °
Sanism is largely invisible and socially acceptable. It is based primar-
ily on stereotype, myth, superstition, and de-individualization. San-
ism is perpetuated by our use of "ordinary common sense" ("OCS")
and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events in every-
day life and the legal process.
Judges are not immune from sanism. "[E]mbedded in the cul-
tural presuppositions that engulf us all,"' 221 they express discomfort
with social science,2 22 or any other system that may appear to chal-
lenge law's hegemony over society, and express skepticism about new
thinking. This discomfort and skepticism allows them to take deeper
refuge in heuristic thinking and flawed, non-reflective, purported
OCS, both of which perpetuate the myths and stereotypes of
217. Perlin, Questions, supra note 14, at 999 (footnote omitted).
218. Much of the text accompanying notes 219-31 is adapted from Perlin, Sanism, supra
note 13, 373-77, 398-406.
219. The classic study is GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
220. The word "sanism" was probably coined by Dr. Morton Birnbaum. See Koe v.
Califano, 573 F.2d 761, 764 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978); Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment:
Some Comments on Its Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL
HEALTH CARE 97, 106-07 (Frank J. Ayd ed., 1974). I discuss Birnbaum's insight in Perlin,
Homelessness, supra note 169, at 92-93. Dr. Birnbaum is widely regarded as having first
developed and articulated the constitutional basis of the right to treatment doctrine for
institutionalized mental patients. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 ABA J.
499 (1960), (discussed in 2 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 4.03, at 8-13).
221. Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 329, 332 (1991).
222. Perlin, Morality, supra note 3, at 133-37; Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12, at 59-
61; see also Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 109, 167-68 (1991).
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223sanism.
B. Sanism and the Court Process in Mental Disability Law Cases
Judges reflect and project the conventional morality of the com-
munity. Judicial decisions in all areas of civil and criminal mental
disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes.224
Their language demonstrates bias against mentally disabled individu-
als225 and contempt for the mental health professions.226 At least one
court, without citation to authority, has found that it is less likely that
medical patients will "fabricate descriptions of their complaints" than
will "psychological patients. 722  Another court has likened psychiat-
ric ability to predict future dangerousness to predictions made by an
oncologist regarding consequences of an untreated and metastasized
malignancy.228 This analogy ignores the overwhelming weight of
clinical and behavioral literature concluding that psychiatrists are far
more often incorrect in predicting dangerousness than they are
correct.229
Courts often appear impatient with mentally disabled litigants
and attribute their problems in the legal process to weak character or
223. Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12, at 61-69; Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66, at
718-30.
224. See Perlin, Sanism, supra note 13, at 400-04.
225. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1522 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (quoting Shuler
v. Wainwright,491 F.2d 1213, 1222 (5th Cir. 1974) (using "lunatic")); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d
549, 569 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (defendant referred to as a "lunatic"), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220
(1984); Pyles v. Boles, 250 F. Supp. 285, 288 (N.D. W. Va. 1966) (trial judge accused habeas
petitioner of "being crazy"); Brown v. People, 134 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ill. 1956) (judge asked
defendant, "You are not crazy at this time, are you?"); cf State v. Penner, 1989 KAN. LEXiS
66, at *3 (Kan. 1989) (witnesses admonished not to refer to defendant as "crazy" or "nuts").
Lawyers for mentally disabled clients are not immune. For example, in oral argument in
Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992), on the question of whether his non-mentally ill,
but dangerous insanity acquittee client should be retained in a forensic mental hospital, defense
counsel "drew nods from several of the justices when he said Foucha's conduct might be the
normal reaction of a sane man surrounded by 'lots of insane people.... A little paranoia is
probably justified.'" Foucha v. Louisiana, 9 Mental Health L. Rep. 111, 112 (1991).
226. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Musolino, 467 A.2d 605, 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(reversible error for trial judge to refer to expert witnesses as "headshrinkers"); cf State v.
Percy, 507 A.2d 955, 956-57 n.l (Vt. 1986), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 344 (1991) (conviction
reversed where prosecutor, in closing argument, referred to expert testimony as "psycho-
babble").
227. People v. LaLone, 437 N.W.2d 611, 613 (Mich. 1989).
228. In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 898 (D.C. 1991).
229. See Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66, at 693-96 (sources cited); see also, e.g., JOHN
MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981); John Monahan,
Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511
(1992); John Monahan, Risk Assessment of Violence Among the Mentally Disordered:
Generating Useful Knowledge, 11 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249 (1988); Christopher Slobogin,
Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1984).
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poor resolve. A popular sanist myth is that "[m]entally disabled indi-
viduals simply don't try hard enough. They give in too easily to their
basest instincts, and do not exercise appropriate self-restraint.
230
One trial judge responding to a National Center for State Courts sur-
vey indicated that defendants who were incompetent to stand trial
could have understood and communicated with counsel and the court
"if they [had] only wanted."' 231 Other court decisions reject psycho-
dynamic understanding and principles that could illuminate issues for
the jurors and give them insight into the actions of mentally disabled
criminal defendants.
232
Equally troubling is judicial ignorance about laws affecting men-
tally disabled persons. For example, an appellate court in Louisiana
reversed a commitment order because the trial judge was not aware of
a state law creating a mental health advocacy service to provide repre-
sentation to indigent people facing involuntary civil commitment.233
A Texas study revealed that a significant number of judges were not
even aware of state statutes recognizing a patient-psychotherapist
privilege.234 With little public attention, other courts have regularly
entered commitment orders without any explicit statutory author-
ity.23 5 Recent studies also demonstrate that judges rarely, and in
some cases never, inform patients at involuntary civil commitment
hearings that they have a right to counsel, a right to seek voluntary
admission, or a right to appeal in the event of actual commitment.236
230. State v. Ducksworth, 496 So. 2d 624, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (no error where juror
who felt defendant would be responsible for actions as long as he "wanted to do them" not
excused for cause); Perlin, Sanism, supra note 13, at 396; see also, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The
Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 238 (1990) (Hinckley prosecutor meant to
suggest to jurors "that if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were largely his own fault").
231. Ingo Keilitz & J. Rudy Martin, Criminal Defendants With Trial Disabilities: The
Theory and Practice of Competency Assistance 90 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author); see also H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless Mentally Ill, 35
HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 899, 943 (1984) (society tends to "morally disapprove of
[mentally disabled] persons who 'give in' to their dependency needs"); cf In re Tarpley, 581
N.E.2d 1251, 1252 (Ind. 1991) (error to hold defendant in contempt of court for failing to take
medication as required by outpatient commitment).
232. On the role of psychodynamics in deciding cases involving mentally disabled criminal
defendants, see generally Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66. For examples of cases, see Stano v.
Dugger, 883 F.2d 900, 908 (1 1th Cir. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 901 F.2d 898 (1 1th
Cir. 1990) (testimony of psychiatrist that mentally ill people often confess to crimes they did
not commit is inadmissible); Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Wyo. 1987) (psychiatric
expert testimony not required to explain defendant's reactions to fear and stress).
233. In re C.P.K., 516 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
234. Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical
Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893, 924 (1982).
235. David B. Wexler, Inappropriate Patient Confinement and Appropriate State Advocacy,
in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96, at 347-48.
236. One study reports that at the patient's initial hearing, fewer than one-third of judges
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All researchers in the area recognize the widespread inadequacy
of counsel at involuntary civil commitment hearings.237 By failing to
insist on adequate representation by assigned counsel,2 38 and by refus-
ing to find error in cases that reflect the starkest denial of adequate
representation, 239  appellate courts perpetuate, condone, and
encourage sanist behavior on the part of trial judges and the arbitrary
abrogation of litigants' liberty in the cases in question. 4°
1. IN INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT CASES
A full understanding of the involuntary civil commitment pro-
cess requires consideration of more than simply the substantive and
procedural limitations on commitment power.241' Therefore, I next
discuss how sanist testimony can subvert legal standards and how this
subversion relates to what currently seems to be the only important
issue considered in involuntary civil commitment decisions:242
whether a patient is "competent" to make the "right choice" and self-
medicate in the community if commitment is not ordered.24 3
I start with three basic principles. First, individuals are pre-
sumed to be competent, and this presumption generally may not be
told patients of their right to counsel, fewer than one-fourth of the right to voluntary status,
and about two-fifths of the right to appeal. Parry & Turkheimer, supra note 118, at 66. By a
patient's second review hearing after six to twelve months in the hospital, less than five percent
mentioned the right to counsel and less than eight percent mentioned voluntary admissions,
while fifteen percent referred to the right to appeal. Id.
237. See generally Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 15.
238. See generally 2 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, §§ 8.11, 8.17-.23.
239. See, e.g., In re McMahon, 581 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (no error where
counsel was appointed on date of involuntary civil commitment hearing).
240. On judges' passive-aggressive behavior in mental disability law cases, see Wexler, supra
note 216, at 40. On some mental health professionals' passive-aggressive behavior, see supra
note 95.
241. See John Petrila, Redefining Mental Health Law: Thoughts on a New Agenda, 16 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 89, 100-01 (1992) ("discussions of the commitment process that ignore...
political realities run the risk of being largely academic").
242. On the important collateral question of what happens in involuntary civil commitment
cases that do not go to a hearing, see, e.g., Dan A. Lewis et al., The Negotiation of Involuntary
Civil Commitment, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 629 (1984); Robert D. Miller et al., The Use of Plea
Bargaining in Civil Commitment, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 395 (1984).
243. See generally cases discussed in 1 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 3.45, at
71-73 nn.726.1-741 (Supp. 1992); Perlin, Homelessness, supra note 169, at 116-17 nn.306-08;
Perlin, Tea Leaves, supra note 6, at 50-51.
This issue is discussed in Donald A. Treffert, The Obviously Ill Patient in Need of
Treatment: A Fourth Standard for Civil Commitment, 36 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
259, 260 (1985) (arguing that the result of stricter legislative commitment criteria was
clinicians waiting for a patient "with an obvious and severe mental illness that was formerly
well controlled on antipsychotic medication [to] become unable to make an informed decision
about treatment and slowly deteriorate until he or she would 'qualify' for detention or
commitment under harsh, realistic commitment criteria").
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overcome except by a judicial determination. 244 This articulation of a
competency presumption is fairly new in the law. As recently as
1972, a federal district court invalidated a Wisconsin statute that had
presumed the opposite: a civilly committed individual was presumed
to be incompetent, although that presumption was rebuttable.2 4
However, the medical profession's record of complying with this man-
date of presumed competency has been significantly spotty.
246
Second, competency is not a "fixed state." A person may at the
same time be competent for some legal purposes and incompetent for
others. Incompetency and mental illness are not identical states.247
As the Supreme Court of Washington noted, "the mere fact that an
individual is mentally ill does not also mean that the person so
affected is incapable of making a rational choice with respect to his or
her need for treatment.' 248 Even if a person is found incompetent to
stand trial, it does not mean that she is incompetent to function in
society.249
Third, the lack of a unitary competency standard also muddles
assessments of competency. The observation by Charles Lidz and his
colleagues more than fifteen years ago that the search for a single test
is akin to a "search for the Holy Grail" 250 still resonates today.
244. See, e.g., Rogers v. Comm'r of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314-15 (Mass.
1983); William M. Brooks, A Comparison of a Mentally Ill Individual's Right to Refuse
Medication Under the United States and New York State Constitutions, 8 ToURo L. REV. 1, 36
(1991); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the
Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515, 538; Note, The Mentally Ill's Right
to Refuse Drug Treatment: A Panacea or a Bitter Pill to Swallow?, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 62, 81
(1989); cf A.E. v. Mitchell, 724 F.2d 864, 867 (10th Cir. 1983) (incompetency determination is
prerequisite for involuntary civil commitment under Utah statute).
245. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473
(1974).
246. Tremblay, supra note 244, at 538-39 n.97 (citing George J. Annas & Joan E.
Densberger, Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment: Autonomy vs. Paternalism, 15 U. TOL.
L. REV. 561, 564 (1984) and Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward
Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 N. ENG. J. MED. 955 (1984) (doctors rarely follow competency
mandate in non-life threatening situations or where it is unlikely that publicity will result from
the decision)).
247. See Winick, supra note 78, at 102-05; see also Wexler, supra note 85, at 8-9.
248. In re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138, 146 (Wash. 1986); see also, e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 495
N.E.2d 337, 342 (N.Y. 1986).
249. Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand
Trial in Light of Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1166
(1986); Perlin, Questions, supra, note 14, at 988; Note, State Mental Health Patients' Right to
Refuse Forcible Administration of Medication Narrowly Construed, 11 SETON HALL L. REV.
796, 807 (1981).
250. Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 279, 283 (1977); see Perlin, Homelessness, supra note 169, at 113-14 (different
competency standards employed in different case categories); Perlin, Questions, supra note 14,
at 967 (same).
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Scholars such as Paul Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso have carefully
conceptualized competency standards into four abilities: (1) to com-
municate choices; (2) to understand relevant information; (3) to
appreciate a situation and its consequences; and (4) to manipulate
information rationally. 251 Despite this work, the response of the en
banc court in United States v. Charters is typical.252 The court, in
essence, threw up its hands and said that no one could possibly distin-
guish between competency to stand trial and competency to refuse
antipsychotic medication.25 3 Other appellate courts share this futile
response.254
Examination of the relationship between competency, treatment
refusal, and the involuntary civil commitment process reveals a para-
dox.255 Fewer than a handful of reported involuntary civil commit-
ment cases have frontally considered right to refuse treatment
claims.256 Most courts simply dismiss such claims as not justiciable in
the involuntary civil commitment context.257 Yet courts routinely
weigh experts' predictions of a patient's potential refusal to take
antipsychotic medication in a community setting as the most proba-
tive evidence on the question of whether involuntary civil commit-
ment is warranted.258 Professor David Wexler presciently noted this
link almost a decade ago;259 yet, the academic journals have been
251. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to
Treatment, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1635-36 (1988).
252.' 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), on reh'g, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
253. 863 F.2d at 310 (distinctions between competency states "must certainly be... of such
subtlety and complexity as to tax perception by the most skilled medical or psychiatric
professionals"); cf. Perlin, Questions, supra note 14, at 988 (characterizing this aspect of the
court's opinion as reflecting "passive-aggressive behavior").
254. Cf. United States v. Hoskie, 950 F.2d 1388, 1390 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (differentiating
between incompetency to stand trial and competency to plead guilty). For other jurisdictions
in accord, see 3 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 14.20, at 266-68 (cases cited).
255. Perlin, Tea Leaves, supra note 6, at 49.
256. See, e.g., In re J.L.J., 509 A.2d 184, 186 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (behavior
modification program).
257. See, e.g., In re Harhut, 367 N.W.2d 628, 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re Wicks, 364
N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); cf In re D.J.M., 386 A.2d 870, 872 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1978) (patient wishing to raise adequacy of treatment issue claim at involuntary civil
commitment hearing must give prior notice to court and adverse parties).
258. Only one reported case appears to question the empirical validity of this assumption.
See In re Richardson, 481 A.2d 473, 479 n.5 (D.C. 1984) ("Not every instance of the
outpatient's failure to take prescribed medication or attend therapy sessions justifies the
conclusion that he is not cooperating with the treatment program" (citing Virginia A. Hiday &
Rodney R. Goodman, The Least Restrictive Alternative to Involuntary Hospitalization,
Outpatient Commitment: Its Use and Effectiveness, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 81, 89 (1982))).
259. Wexler, supra note 85, at 9 ("the relationship between competence and commitment




strangely silent on the fact that this perceived link between drug
refusal and necessity for involuntary commitment has become the
dominant issue in such commitment cases.
Most of the reported cases rely on psychiatric "expert" predic-
tions as the dispositive evidence.26° Although there is widespread
belief that refusal to take such medication will make some patients
more dangerous,2 61 there is absolutely no evidence that psychiatrists
have any special ability to predict community medication compli-
ance.2 62 There is another body of evidence suggesting that the popu-
lation (of individuals facing civil commitment or those once
committed and now seeking release) is comprised of precisely those
individuals that many community mental health centers do not want
to treat.
263
Nevertheless, courts regularly order involuntary civil commit-
ment when testifying experts merely find it "doubtful" that a patient
will self-medicate in the community.26" For example, even though an
operative state statute included a presumption that the subject of the
commitment petition did not require treatment 26 5 and that civil com-
mitment required clear and convincing evidence of a "serious risk of
harm, '2 66 a court affirmed a commitment order based on expert testi-
mony that the patient would "benefit" from medication, that the
260. For an example of a court rejecting this line of thinking, see In re J.S.C., 812 S.W.2d
92, 95-96 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (testimony that patient will deteriorate if he fails to take
medication is insufficient basis upon which to sustain involuntary civil commitment
determination).
261. Teresa L. Scheid-Cook, Commitment of the Mentally Ill to Outpatient Treatment, 23
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 173, 180 (1987).
262. The literature reveals no studies on this question. A recent reconsideration of
dangerousness studies lists over 40 factors to be considered by experts in assessing probabilities
of an individual's future violence. Community medication compliance is not included. George
B. Palermo et al., On the Predictability of Violent Behavior: Considerations and Guidelines, 36
J. FORENSIC SC. 1435, 1440 (1991); see also id. at 1439 ("One should not deduce the
possibility for future dangerousness from an isolated, individual trait.").
263. Scheid-Cook, supra note 261, at 181-82 (citing Robert Stern & Kenneth Minkoff,
Paradoxes in Programming for Chronic Patients in a Community Clinic, 30 HosP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 613 (1979)); see also ANN B. JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE
TRUTH ABOUT DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 78 (1990); Steven J. Schwartz & Cathy E.
Costanzo, Compelling Treatment in the Community: Distorted Doctrines and Violated Values,
20 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1329, 1386-89 (1987).
264. See, e.g., In re L.B., 452 N.W.2d 75, 77 (N.D. 1990). In the same case, another expert
had testified that the patient did not suffer from a mental illness.
265. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-19 (1989); see also In re Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22, 26
(N.D. 1983) (interpreting statute).
266. This is defined as a "[s]ubstantial deterioration in mental health which would
predictably result in dangerousness to that person, others, or property, based upon acts,
threats, or patterns in the person's treatment history, current condition, and other relevant
factors." N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02(10)(d) (1989).
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"only way" such medication could be provided in a supervised man-
ner was in a "structured residential type of placement," and that "if
she was discharged from the hospital, she would quit taking her medi-
cation .. *267 In another case brought under a statute requiring
proof that the respondent would be "likely to attempt to physically
harm himself or others.., unless involuntary commitment is contin-
ued, '261 the court found testimony that the individual was in need of
long-term medication to help control his mental illness and that he
was "unlikely" to take the medication absent extended hospitalization
sufficient to order commitment.
269
Similarly, other courts rely upon like testimony in recommitment
hearings following insanity acquittals.27° Courts continue commit-
ments if such an individual "would not likely take his medication reg-
ularly as an outpatient," even where the potential danger would not
be "imminent,"'271 or if there were a "high likelihood that without
adequate supervision [the patient] would stop taking [his]
medication.
272
What we may have here is a pretext within a pretext. Not only
are psychiatrists encouraged by the leaders of their profession to sub-
vert testimonial standards, but they are encouraged by the courts to
share their "expertise" on an issue about which they may not be
"experts. ' 273 It is probably not coincidental that H. Richard Lamb,
one of organized psychiatry's most visible critics of deinstitutionaliza-
tion, is among those urging courts not to take commitment standards
too literally. According to Lamb, there is a link between deinstitu-
tionalization and homelessness that has been exacerbated by activist
and excessively civil libertarian courts.274 If medication noncompli-
ance in the community leads to deterioration and decompensation,
267. In re R.N., 453 N.W.2d 819, 822 (N.D. 1990).
268. MINN. STAT. § 253B.12, subd. 4 (1982).
269. In re Thornblad, No. C9-91-1501, 1991 WL 271491, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24,
1991).
270. This is also frequently the dispositive issue in post-insanity acquittee/NGRI release
hearings. See, e.g., State v. Jacob, 669 P.2d 865, 869 (Utah 1983) (citing Warren v. Harvey,
632 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 902 (1980)); Clark v. State, 261 S.E.2d 764 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1979), aff'd, 266 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. 1980); Bethany v. Stubbs, 393 So. 2d 1351 (Miss.
1981) (incompetency to stand trial)).
In at least one case, a court has considered the role of the jury in determining whether
such an insanity acquittee would self-medicate in the future. See People v. Williams, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 429, 430-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
271. Lawrence v. State, 410 S.E.2d 136, 137 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
272. People v. Bolden, 266 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
273. See Perlin, Forensic System, supra note 153, at 2; see also supra note 153.
274. See Perlin, Homelessness, supra note 169, at 86-97 (discussing Lamb's critique). I
respond directly to this critique in Douglas Mossman & Michael L. Perlin, Psychiatry and the
Homeless Mentally Il: A Reply to Dr. Lamb, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 951, 952 (1992).
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and this then "causes" homelessness, psychiatrists can exert moral
suasion in the forensic setting by making predictions about such dete-
rioration at the involuntary civil commitment hearing. Whether or
not psychiatrists have expertise to predict noncompliance-a power
that is presumably a necessary predicate to this testimony-is neatly
forgotten.
The same line of thinking affects voluntary commitment deci-
sionmaking. 2" Although such patients generally have an absolute
right to refuse medication,276 invocation of that right frequently leads
to a transfer to involuntary status. 277 At hearings to determine the
appropriateness of a status transfer, courts often rely on refusal to
take antipsychotic medication as a sufficient basis to reject continued
voluntary status or to order involuntary civil commitment.2 78
Outpatient commitment ("OPC") cases reflect similar decision-
making.279 Individuals unable to make informed decisions "to seek
voluntary treatment or comply with recommended treatment" are
thus subject to OPC.2 0 Statutes typically consider medication com-
pliance as a criterion in the invocation of OPC, and case law appears
to explicitly endorse this use of the status.28' If forced drugging is the
"core of OPC," and if OPC's effectiveness depends on the ability of
courts to compel resisting outpatients to take antipsychotic medica-
tions,282 then, again, it is necessary to consider the extent of the power
that sanist judicial thinking may exert on the mental disability
system.283
This entire inquiry takes on new meaning when we consider
275. See Perlin, Tea Leaves, supra note 6, at 50.
276. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2d(l) (West 1981); Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right
to Refuse Treatment With Antipsychotic Medications: Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 413, 413 (1988).
277. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-104 (Michie 1991).
278. See, e.g., Wessel v. Pryor, 461 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D. Ark. 1978); In re Melas, 371
N.W.2d 653, 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re J.B., 705 P.2d 598, 602 (Mont. 1985).
279. See Perlin, Tea Leaves, supra note 6, at 50-51. See generally Gerry McCafferty &
Jeanne Dooley, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment: An Update, 14 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 277 (1990).
280. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
281. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-201(b)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1992) (allowing OPC
where patient is subject to the "obligation to participate in any medically appropriate
outpatient treatment, including ... medication .... ); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(dm) (West
1987 & Supp. 1992) (OPC permissible if court finds that patient's dangerousness "is likely to
be controlled with appropriate medication administered on an outpatient basis"); In re
Anderson, 140 Cal. Rptr. 546, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
282. Schwartz & Costanzo, supra note 263, at 1384; Susan Stefan, Preventive Commitment:
The Concept and Its Pitfalls, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 288, 294 (1987).
283. See generally Jillane T. Hinds, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment for the Chronically
Mentally I1, 69 NEB. L. REV. 346, 367-76 (1990).
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recent empirical studies that demonstrate how little information is
given to released patients about their medication regimens and how
poorly such information is processed. A recently published survey
reveals that more than half the patients discharged from short-stay
treatment programs, including one conducted at an Ivy League medi-
cal school's teaching hospital, did not know the name or the appropri-
ate dosage of the antipsychotic medications prescribed for them or
why they were being asked to take these medications.28 4 If patients do
not have this baseline knowledge, then one more layer of pretext is
added to the system.
2. IN THE INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL PROCESS
Sanist pretexts similarly infect incompetency to stand trial juris-
prudence in four critical ways: (1) courts resolutely adhere to the
conviction that defendants regularly malinger and feign incompe-
tency; (2) courts stubbornly refuse to understand the distinction
between incompetency to stand trial and insanity, even though the
two statuses involve different concepts, different standards, and differ-
ent points on the "time line"; (3) courts misunderstand the relation-
ship between incompetency and subsequent commitment, and fail to
consider the lack of a necessary connection between post-determina-
tion institutionalization and appropriate treatment; and (4) courts
regularly accept patently inadequate expert testimony in incompe-
tency to stand trial cases.
a. Fear of Faking
Malingering by mentally disabled criminal defendants is statisti-
cally rare.285 Research reveals that defendants attempt feigning in
less than eight percent of all competency to stand trial inquiries.286
284. Cathryn Clary et al., Psychiatric Inpatients' Knowledge of Medication at Hospital
Discharge, 43 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 140, 142 (1992); see also Jeffrey L. Geller,
State Hospital Patients and Their Medication: Do They Know What They Take?, 139 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 611, 612 (1982) (only 22% of patients tested could name their medications; 41%
gave correct frequency of administration); David A. Soskis, Schizophrenic and Medical
Inpatients as Informed Drug Consumers, 35 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 645, 646 (1978)
(36% of patients tested knew correct medication dosages).
285. Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66, at 715-16 nn.556-58 (sources cited); see also, e.g.,
David Schretlen & Hal Arkowitz, A Psychological Test Battery to Detect Prison Inmates who
Fake Insanity or Mental Retardation, 8 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 75, 75 (1990) ("92-95% of
subjects were correctly classified as either faking or not faking").
286. Dewey G. Cornell & Gary L. Hawk, Clinical Presentation of Malingerers Diagnosed by
Experienced Forensic Psychologists, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 380-83 (1989). On the
potential role of racial bias in such determinations, see id. at 382 (clinicians may overdiagnose
malingering in black defendants).
For other recent research, see, e.g., R. Michael Bagby et al., Detection of Dissimulation
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Yet, in deciding incompetency to stand trial cases, courts continue to
focus, in some cases almost obsessively, on testimony that raises the
specter of malingering. 28 7 The fear of such deception has "permeated
the American legal system for over a century, '288 despite the com-
plete lack of evidence that such feigning "has ever been a remotely
significant problem of criminal procedure. 28 9 This fear is a further
manifestation of judicial sanism.
b. Conflation of Standards
Trial courts continue to blur the distinction between incompe-
tency to stand trial and insanity. 290 They confuse these concepts
despite countless appellate admonitions as to the differences between
the two states,291 and despite different substantive standards, different
behavioral criteria, and obvious temporal differences. 292 Courts often
ask defendants and experts irrelevant and meaningless questions that
bear no relationship to the ultimate question to be decided by the
court.
2 9 3
with the New Generation of Objective Personality Measures, 8 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 93 (1990);
Richard Rogers et al., The SIRS as a Measure of Malingering: A Validation Study with a
Correctional Sample, 8 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 85 (1990); Orest E. Wasyliw et al., The
Detection of Malingering in Criminal Forensic Groups: MMPI Validity Scales, 52 J.
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 321 (1988).
287. See, e.g., Cowan v. State, 579 So. 2d 13, 15 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); Farinas v. State,
569 So. 2d 425, 432 (Fla. 1990) (Grimes, J., dissenting); State v. Sharkey, 821 S.W.2d 544, 546
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Perkins, 562 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); State v.
Evans, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 1054 (Ohio 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 246 (1992); Blacklock v.
State, 820 S.W.2d 882, 884-85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 727-28
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
288. Perlin, Symbolic Values, supra note 144, at 98.
289. Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66, at 714.
290. See 3 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 14.02, at 208 n.7 (sources cited).
291. See, e.g., United States v. McEachern, 465 F.2d 833, 836 (5th Cir. 1972) ("we note the
possible confusion caused by [the trial court's] use of the term 'insane' when the relevant
inquiry is competence to stand trial"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 (1972); State v. Spivey, 319
A.2d 461, 470 (N.J. 1974) ("[t]he Court must be careful to distinguish between insanity and
incapacity to stand trial"); Aponte v. State, 153 A.2d 665, 669-70 (N.J. 1959). The error is
often deemed harmless. See, e.g., Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1295 (N.D. Ga. 1989),
aff'd, 908 F.2d 695 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
292. For the different standards, compare 3 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5,
§§ 14.03-.05 (incompetency to stand trial) with id. §§ 15.03-.09 (insanity defense). For the
purpose of inquiry regarding competency to stand trial, the relevant time is the time of the
trial; for inquiry regarding insanity, the relevant time is the time of the crime.
293. See, e.g., RICHARD ARENS, INSANITY DEFENSE 78-79 (1974) (reproducing transcripts
of competency hearings in which the judge merely asked defendants the date, the names of the
President and Vice President, and the Washington Senators' (baseball team) standing in the
American League); see also Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 12, at 24 n.95 (discussing
ARENS, supra); Poythress, supra note 92, at 218 (reporting on a case in which the court asked
the forensic psychologist who had administered the MMPI test to the defendant, "Do you
believe in free will?" and "Do you believe in God?").
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While much of the confusion may stem from experts' confusion
about the two terms, 294 it is clear that attorneys, trial judges, forensic
witnesses, and other testifying mental health professionals equally
misunderstand the core concepts. 295 The fact that this state of affairs
continues, with little or no remediation, suggests that its perpetuation
continues to meet sanist aims.296
c. Misunderstanding of Incompetency Commitments
Empirical studies demonstrate that trial judges misunderstand
the relationship between a finding of incompetency to stand trial and
subsequent hospital commitment. In a state-wide study conducted
four years after the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana,297
almost one-half of all judges polled believed that commitment of
incompetent criminal defendants to forensic hospitals should be auto-
matic without regard to the severity of the underlying criminal offense
or to the defendant's present dangerousness. 298  A more recent
national study of trial judges revealed that such hospitalization was
the judicial intervention of choice in nearly ninety percent of all
cases. 299 Even in states that expressly sanction outpatient commit-
ment as an alternative in criminal incompetency cases, judges remain
reluctant to employ this mechanism due to their fear that the patient
might become violent in an outpatient setting.3 °
Unfortunately, there is no necessary correlation between such
institutionalization and appropriate treatment. The starkest case is
294. See DEBRA WHITCOMB & RONALD L. BRANDT, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 2
(1985); George E. Dix & Norman G. Poythress, Propriety of Medical Dominance ofForensic
Mental Health Practice: The Empirical Evidence, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 961, 972-74 (1981); David
B. Wexler et al., The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13
ARIz. L. REV. 1, 64-65 (1971); Carl R. Vann & Fred Morganroth, Psychiatrists and the
Competence to Stand Trial, 42 U. DET. L. REV. 75, 84 (1964); Helene R. Banks, Immediate
Appeal of Pretrial Commitment Orders: "It's Now or Never," 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 785, 786
n.8 (1987).
295. William H. Erickson et al., Competence to Stand Trial, in MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS, supra note 135, at 157, 159. For an example of counsel's misunderstanding, see
Kirk v. State, 308 S.E.2d 592, 598 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (counsel mistakenly asked for
incompetency to stand trial charge in insanity case), aff'd, 311 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 1984).
296. Misstatements of the appropriate standard continue. See Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d
1546, 1554 (10th Cir. 1991) (record revealed "unambiguously that the state trial court's
evaluation of [defendant's] competency was infected by a misperception of the legal
requirements set out in Dusky"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1942 (1992).
297. 406 U.S. 715, 731, 738 (1972) (incompetent criminal defendants cannot automatically
be indefinitely housed in maximum security forensic facilities if it is not likely that they will
regain their competency to stand trial within the foreseeable future).
298. Roesch & Golding, supra note 130, at 423-24.
299. Keilitz & Martin, supra note 231, at 84.
300. Ann L. Hester, State v. Gravette" Is There Justice for Incompetent Defendants in
North Carolina?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1484, 1497 (1991).
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that of Theon Jackson, the appellant in Jackson v. Indiana. Jackson
was a mentally retarded, deaf mute individual, incapable of reading,
writing or communicating in any way except through a limited
knowledge of sign language. He was indicted on two counts of rob-
bery, both apparently involving purse snatching.3 1 Notwithstanding
testimony at his competency hearing that it was unlikely that Jackson
could ever learn to read, write, or use sign language proficiently, and
that it would be impossible for him to learn minimal communication
skills in an Indiana state institution,3 2 the trial court committed Jack-
son indefinitely to a state hospital "until such time as [the state]
should certify to the court that 'the defendant is sane.' "30
Although the Supreme Court held in favor of Jackson, striking
down such commitments as tantamount to life sentences without
trial,3° the underlying problem has not been fully ameliorated. As of
seven years after the decision in Jackson, almost one-half of the states
had not implemented its holding, and pre-Jackson problems "still
persist[ed]."305
The commitment of defendants in incompetency to stand trial
cases to forensic hospitals often triggers a "shuttle" mechanism.
Defendants are treated (usually with antipsychotic drugs),30 6 tempo-
rarily stabilized, returned to court, found competent, and jailed to
await trial. At this point, many "destabilize" and become incompe-
tent once again.307 This endless cycle has been well documented,
308
but courts have been remarkably, and uniformly, silent in their sanist
non-responses.
d. Acceptance of Inadequate Testimony
Finally, courts regularly accept inadequate testimony in incom-
301. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 717.
302. Id. at 718-19.
303. Id. at 719 (emphasis added).
304. Id. at 731-38.
305. Winick, supra note 156, at 941; see Wertlieb, supra note 80, at 336; discussion supra
note 156. I discuss the significance of this finding in Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 15, at
47-48. Cf State v. Werner, 796 P.2d 610, 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (it was not error to treat
dangerous patients committed pursuant to Jackson differently from civil patients).
306. See 3 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 14.09 (cases cited).
307. Hester, supra note 300, at 1498; see Bruce J. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An
Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 248-49
(1987); Winick, supra note 156, at 934.
308. See, e.g., Wertlieb, supra note 80, at 337 (discussing United States v. Juarez, 540 F.
Supp. 1288 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (mentally retarded, incompetent-to-stand-trial defendant was
not treated for over three years due to jurisdictional dispute between state and federal
institutions)).
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petency to stand trial cases.3" For example, in State v. Pruitt, the sole
expert witness testified in conclusory terms that the defendant "suf-
fered no mental disease or defect; and he understood the respective
roles of the cast of characters at the trial, and the nature of the
charges against him," yet "never indicated . . . what the defendant
actually understood. ' 310  Although the appellate court reversed
Pruitt's conviction on other grounds, a majority of the court was sat-
isfied that this testimony was a sufficient basis for a competency find-
ing.311 In Hensley v. State, the court found no abuse of discretion on
the issue of incompetency to stand trial where the defendant was able
to deny the crime and name the alleged victim, despite the uncon-
tested fact that the defendant's "testimony and actions at the compe-
tency hearing were not generally meaningful. ' 31 2 In People v. Lopez,
the appellate court held that the trial court's decision not to conduct a
competency hearing was not error, notwithstanding defendant's his-
tory of hospitalization, attempted suicide, drug overdose, use of pre-
scribed psychotropic medications, and suicidal thoughts.31 3 These
and other similar cases314 suggest that the most minimal testimony
will satisfy courts in such incompetency to stand trial inquiries.
C. Nonsanist Courts315
Certainly, not all judges write in a sanist voice. Some nonsanist
309. WHITCOMB & BRANDT, supra note 294, at 2 (experts' reports are often "empty and
meaningless"). For a review of such deficiencies, see id. at 1 (reporting on findings in Ingo
Keilitz, Mental Health Examination in Criminal Justice Settings: Organization,
Administration, and Program Evaluation (Sept. 1981) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the National Center for State Courts) (courts often fail to provide reasons for evaluation
requests and fail to screen out unwarranted evaluation requests; no agreement exists between
the justice and mental health systems as to the purpose of evaluation; and the evaluation report
is frequently delayed at great length)).
310. 480 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). The witness also admitted that while he
had been aware that the defendant was evaluated by mental health professionals at a V.A.
hospital, he did not have copies of those records and that, depending on the content of those
records, his opinion might have been different. Id.
311. Id. at 509 (Markus, J., concurring); id. (Nahra, J., concurring).
312. 575 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ind. App. Ct. 1991).
313. People v. Lopez, 576 N.E.2d 246, 248-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
314. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 938 F.2d 1092, 1093-95 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 427 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court's refusal to hold a second
competency hearing where defendant exposed himself and urinated in courtroom); Rollins v.
Leonardo, 938 F.2d 380, 382 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 944 (1992) (defendant was
an escapee from a psychiatric hospital at the time that he was tried for the offense); United
States v. Caicedo, 937 F.2d 1227, 1232 (7th Cir. 1991) (although trial counsel stated that he
did not know if the defendant "could cooperate with him in the preparation of his defense, he
[stated that defendant] was 'perfectly competent' ").
315. This section is largely adapted from Perlin, Sanism, supra note 13, at 400-04.
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opinions, such as Judge Johnson's Wyatt v. Stickney3 16 decisions, are
firmly rooted in a rights/empowerment model.317 Others, like Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle,318 Justice Stevens's partial
dissent in Washington v. Harper,319 and the New Jersey Supreme
Court's opinion in State v. Krol,320 specifically rebut sanist myths.
Still others, such as Justice Stevens's dissent in Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman,321 Justices Stevens's and Marshall's sepa-
rate opinions in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,322 and
Judge Kaufman's use of a "Gulag archipelago" metaphor in a Second
Circuit case involving a mentally disabled prisoner,323 express elo-
quent outrage at institutional conditions that inevitably flow from a
sanist society. Finally, some decisions express true empathy and
understanding about the plight of the institutionalized mentally dis-
abled. 324  A handful of judges have spent their careers rooting out
sanist myths and stereotypes, and raising the legal system's conscious-
ness about sanism's impact on all of society.325 Other judges, in less
known cases, have also shown real sensitivity to the underlying
issues. These examples, however, clearly constitute the minority of
316. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), supplemented, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.
1971), supplemented, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), supplemented, 344 F. Supp. 387
(M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
317. See generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 131-45 (1990) (discussing the application of the rights/
empowerment model on behalf of the mentally ill and mentally retarded).
318. 463 U.S. 880, 916-38 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
319. 494 U.S. 210, 237-40 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
320. 344 A.2d 289 (N.J. 1975).
321. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 126-28 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
322. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 454-55 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 455, 461-67 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
323. United States ex reL Schuster v. Vincent, 524 F.2d 153, 154 (2d Cir. 1975).
324. My favorite is Judge Brotman's opinion in the class action Rennie v. Klein, 476 F.
Supp. 1294, 1309 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119
(1982):
Medicine has not yet found a cure for the terrible pain of mental illness. The law
cannot assist in this endeavor. But the Constitution can and does prevent those
who have suffered so much at the hands of nature from being subjected to further
suffering at the hands of man.
325. Judge David L. Bazelon is the finest example. See Heathcole W. Wales, The Rise, the
Fall, and the Resurrection of the Medical Model, 63 GEO. L.J. 87, 104 (1974) (Judge Bazelon
"invited the world of mental health professionals and criminologists into his courtroom" and
"extended his courtroom back into the world"). See generally, e.g., David L. Bazelon, Veils,
Values, and Social Responsibility, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 115 (1982).
326. See, e.g., Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1942
(1992); United States v. Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1990); S.H. v. Edwards, 860 F.2d 1045,
1053 (11th Cir. 1988) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989), vacated, 880
F.2d 1203 (lth Cir. 1989); Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542 (lth Cir. 1984); In re
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cases. Sanism regularly and relentlessly infects the courts in the same
ways that it infects public discourse.327
V. CONCLUSION
A. Is the System Pretextual?
So, where are we? Is the entire mental disability system one
giant dropsy hearing? Is this inquiry utterly nihilistic? I have no
doubt that my basic theory holds: the mental disability law process is
pretextual, and its pretextuality is informed by misplaced conscious
notions of "morality" and by inevitable unconscious use of cognitive
heuristics and biased sanism.
Although the mental disability system's condition is grave, I
think it is not hopeless. I have argued elsewhere that the legal system,
as it affects mentally disabled criminal defendants, largely has pro-
ceeded out of consciousness. 328 The same proposition applies to civil
commitment cases. Legal actors repeat cherished myths, disparage
social science, reject alternative constructions of reality, and
marginalize the mentally disabled parties before the court.329 This
should not, however, lead us to the position that competency inquiries
are necessarily flawed or that courts are incapable of finding the facts
in an unbiased way.
Dropsy cases developed as they have because they serve both
instrumental and normative purposes. By sanctioning police perjury,
judges believe they are interpreting the law as it should be, in a way
that serves a broad array of societal aims. By privileging "moral"
testimony, judges believe that they are deciding cases as they should
be decided, in a way that serves other societal aims.33° Competency
Peterson, 446 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Murphy, 760 P. 2d 280 (Utah
1988).
327. Two recent United States Supreme Court cases further illuminate the extent to which
sanism continues to affect the Court's decisions. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992)
(evaluating the appropriateness of continuing an insanity acquittee's mental hospital
commitment when he is no longer mentally ill, but remains dangerous); Riggins v. Nevada,
112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (determining whether medicating a defendant deprives him of a fair
trial by preventing him from presenting his natural demeanor to the jury as part of his insanity
defense).
328. See Perlin, Symbolic Values, supra note 144, at 98; Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 66, at
731.
329. See generally Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 13.
330. See supra part II; cf. United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1984)
(Rubin, J., dissenting) (quoting WILLIAM J. WINSLADE & JUDITH W. Ross, THE INSANITY
PLEA 2-3 (1983)):
Like everyone else, judges watch television, read newspapers and magazines,
listen to gossip, and are sometimes themselves victims. They receive the message
trenchantly described in a recent book criticizing the insanity defense: "Perhaps
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inquiries are especially susceptible to pretexts, morality, heuristics,
and sanism. Courts are reluctant to "unpack" competency, to con-
sider it as a collection of functional parts, and to weigh competing
"stacks" of social science data that affect competency findings.13 1
Experts employ an outcome-determinative test: if they agree with the
patient's decision, then she's competent; if not, then she's not.3 32
Dissenting from a panel decision reversing an involuntary civil
commitment order, District of Columbia Court of Appeals Judge
Schwelb cast the case in the language of the classical myth of the
"Pyrrhic victory":
Once upon a time, long, long ago, the King of Epirus defeated
his Roman adversaries in a battle at Asculum. Unfortunately for
him and his cause, however, a large part of his army was
destroyed. "Another such victory over the Romans," his majesty
exclaimed, "and we are utterly undone." The King's name was
Pyrrhus, and the kind of triumph which brought the winner such
travail has come to be known as a Pyrrhic victory.
I am very much afraid that what Tommie Melton has won
through litigation may be as counter-productive in the long run as
the famous monarch's flawed win at Asculum. Indeed, I am con-
strained to wonder how many of the homeless persons who live
wretched and squalid lives on grates and benches and pavements in
our nation's capital are there because they have "won," through
litigation or the threat thereof, or as a result of premature deinsti-
tutionalization, the "liberty" not to be required to take medication
essential to their mental health.
333
This metaphor is a powerful and important one. It speaks dra-
matically and poetically about a desperate social problem. However,
it does so in an utterly acontextual way. Although an immense data
base has been available on precisely the questions Judge Schwelb
frames,33 4 the opinion cites neither empirical evidence nor social sci-
ence data in support of the speculations. It is a textbook heuristic
the bottom line of all these complaints is that guilty people go free-guilty people
who do not have to accept judgment or responsibility for what they have done
and are not held accountable.... These are not cases in which the defendant is
alleged to have committed a crime. Everyone knows he did it."
331. For the classic example, see United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en
banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990). See generally Perlin, Questions, supra note 14.
332. Professor Keri Gould reports that a prominent expert witness made precisely this
statement at a recent meeting of the Suffolk County Academies of Law and Medicine,
apparently surprising none of those in attendance. Interview with Prof. Gould, supra note 104.
333. In re Melton, 565 A.2d 635, 649 (D.C. 1989) (Schwelb, J., dissenting), reh'g granted,
581 A.2d 788 (D.C. 1990), aff'd, 597 A.2d 892 (D.C. 1991).
334. See Perlin, Homelessness, supra note 169, at 94-108.
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statement, and a perfect metaphor for the issues I have been
discussing.
Courts involuntarily civilly commit individuals based on evi-
dence that does not meet statutory criteria. Empirical research
reporting this fact falls universally on deaf ears.335 Criminal defend-
ants are shuttled through the incompetency to stand trial process for
reasons having little, if anything, to do with the articulated standards
of Dusky, Pate, and Drope v. Missouri.336 Courts continue commit-
ments because of a fear that patients are incompetent to make one
specific decision (whether or not to self-medicate), even though there
is no evidence that the forensic witnesses in such cases have any spe-
cial ability to predict future compliance with medication regimens.337
All of this decisionmaking proceeds on a variety of conscious and
unconscious levels.
B. Some Modest Recommendations
So what, if anything, can be done? First, factual education alone
is not enough.338 Attitudinal education is also needed. 339 Both trial
lawyers and expert witnesses have an important educative function.3 4°
They must educate jurors and judges as to the facts, the law, the social
science, and the cognitive theories that inform our behaviors and our
attitudes. Although systemic heuristic errors may be embedded in
our cognitive processes, we can at least inform judges and legislators
about their pernicious power.
Next, we must consider the value of "therapeutic jurisprudence"
as a model through which to assess these questions. "Therapeutic
jurisprudence" studies the role of the law as a therapeutic, or anti-
therapeutic, agent. It recognizes that substantive rules, legal proce-
dures, and lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or anti-thera-
peutic consequences. It questions whether such rules, procedures,
335. See supra part III.B.2.
336. 420 U.S. 162 (1975); see supra note 4; see also supra part III.B.3.
337. See supra part W.B.1.
338. See Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 15, at 52 & n.74 (discussing Norman G.
Poythress, Jr., Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope With
Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 15 (1978) (merely training lawyers about
psychiatric techniques and psychological nomenclature made little difference in case outcomes;
"trained" lawyers' court behavior did not materially differ from that of "untrained" lawyers
because their attitudes did not change)).
339. See Perlin, Sanism, supra note 13, at 330 (we must "bear witness to sanist acts.., and
speak up ... when sanist stereotypes are employed").
340. See, e.g., ROBERT L. SADOFF, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR




and roles can or should be reshaped in order.. to enhance their thera-
peutic potential while not subordinating principles of due process. 341'
The questions I have tried to deal with in this paper could be the
source of several related therapeutic jurisprudential inquiries. If
courts condone pretextuality at involuntary civil commitment and
incompetency to stand trial hearings, then what therapeutic, or anti-
therapeutic, impact does that have on the individuals who are subject
to such hearings? 34 2 If expert witnesses knowingly and openly subvert
statutory and case law standards, a subversion in which courts readily
collaborate, then what impact does that have? Finally, what is the
impact of the domination of sanist myths on the judicial psyche?
343
John Ensminger and Thomas Liguori originally published their
ground breaking essay on the therapeutic potential of the involuntary
civil commitment hearing in 1978.341 There has been little follow-up
work building on their insights. The addition of the questions raised
in this paper to the therapeutic jurisprudence research agenda will
allow researchers to consider their insights in light of the intervening
fifteen years of empirical experience.
Also, counsel who represent mentally disabled litigants in trial
and appellate cases need to consider these issues and to articulate
them in appropriate court arguments.3 45 Notwithstanding the general
lackluster performance of counsel in this area, 46 there are enough
institutionally structured and individual exceptions3 47 to inspire a
measure of hope.
Finally, all of the issues on the table are crying out for more
341. See generally THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 96; ESSAYS IN
THEREPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 78; David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into
Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992). I
consider the therapeutic jurisprudential potential of the tort "duty to protect" doctrine in
Perlin, Tarasoff, supra note 171, at 54-62.
342. Social science literature confirms that the expectation that a process is "fair" generally
mollifies even the losing parties. See, e.g., E. ALLEN LIND & ToM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 66-67 (1988); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological
Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implicationsfor Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L.
REV. 433 (1992); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess
the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 103 (1988).
343. See Deborah A. Dorfman, Pretexts in Commitment and Medication Decisionmaking
Through a Therapeutic Jurisprudential Filter, - N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM RTs. - (forthcoming
1993).
344. See Ensminger & Liguori, supra note 96.
345. On counsel's educative function in the trial of mental disability cases in general, see
Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 15, at 52.
346. See id. at 49-52.
347. See 2 PERLIN, CIVIL & CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 8.08 (describing state statutory
programs); id. § 8.11, at 786 n.217 (discussing importance of private counsel with lead roles in
major mental disability law reform cases).
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empirical scrutiny.3 48 If groups such as the American Psychology-
Law Society, the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, or the
International Academy of Law and Mental Health were to devote a
major conference to study the results of behavioral research in this
area, such a commitment would help shape the issues for all of the
relevant policymakers.349
These recommendations are modest. However, if we are to shed
the "dropsy" model of deceit, duplicity, and deception, and replace it
with a new model of openness, awareness and candor, I believe that
they are an appropriate place to start.
348. See Ingo Keilitz, Researching and Reforming the Insanity Defense, 39 RUTGERS L.
REV. 289 (1987); Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 15, at 58-59; Henry J. Steadman,
Mental Health Law and the Criminal Offender: Research Directions for the 1990's, 39
RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1987).
349. The November 1990 conference run by the National Center for State Courts' Institute
on Mental Disability and Law on "Justice and Mental Health Systems Interactions" would
serve as an excellent model. See Pamela Casey et al., Toward an Agenda for Reform of Justice
and Mental Health Systems Interactions, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107 (1992); Ingo Keilitz,
Justice and Mental Health Systems Interactions: An Overview and Introduction to the Special
Issue, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1992).
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